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Abstract
 A prominent psychological theory on early cognitive development is Spelke’s 
Core Knowledge (CK) hypothesis (Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 
1992), which posits that human infants, and possibly other species, are guided by 
innate understandings of how object movements, classification and quantification are 
governed by physical laws and, further, how agents  are capable of perceptions and 
purposive action. CK is  a set of cognitive building blocks, which serve as  the 
foundation for more complex cognition such as acquisition and use of symbol 
systems pertaining to language and mathematics (Spelke, 2000). Evidence points to 
four core systems of knowledge: representation of number, object, space (or 
geometry) and agency. Investigation of spontaneous CK in nonhuman species in the 
wild is fundamental to understanding the ecological validity and evolutionary context 
for a set of systems that is proposed to be universally embedded. The bold, 
inquisitive manner, naïve fearlessness and unique insect caching behaviour of wild 
North Island robins (Petroica longipes) presents a unique opportunity to identify and 
characterise CK in a new model system. Six studies were conducted with the aim of 
investigating core developmental cognition in robins.
 The first three studies focused on perception of numerical quantity. Study 1 
investigated the ability to discriminate between both large and small quantities, 
finding that robins successfully discriminate between unusually large quantities 
independent of ratio.  Study 2 explored quantity discrimination in which summation of 
items is spatially distributed across an array, and found that while robins perform 
successfully with small numbers, the task presented substantially more cognitive 
demand. Study 3 measured robins’ reactions to computation by presenting simple 
addition and subtraction problems in a Violation of Expectancy (VoE) paradigm, 
finding that robins search longer when presented with a mathematically incongruent 
scenario. 
     The last three studies focused on perception of agency. Study 4 investigated 
robins’ response to gaze direction in humans in a competitive paradigm, and found 
that they were sensitive to human gaze direction in all conditions but one. Study 5 
explored perception of physical capability in humans, and results indicated that limb 
visibility significantly influences pilfering choice. Study 6 examined robins’ perception 
of animacy in prey, finding that in a VoE paradigm, robins’ expectation of hidden prey 
continuity varies depending on mobility and animacy.
 Taken together, the results  of these six studies suggest that while supportive of 
fundamental characteristics defining basic Core Knowledge in many ways, some 
unique results in the cognitive abilities of this biologically naïve species shed new 
light on our growing understanding of the shared basis  of cognition. A deeper look at 
avian performance in core developmental tasks, especially in a naïve wild 
population, can offer new insights  into sweeping evolutionary theories that underpin 
basic cognitive mechanisms.
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“Now listen, Doctor, and I’ll tell you something. Did you know animals can talk?”
“My! You don’t say so!” said the Doctor. “You never talked that way to me before.”
“What would have been the good?” said Polynesia. “You wouldn’t have understood 
me if I had.” 
- Hugh Lofting, Doctor Dolittle1 
1
1 Abridged quotation; selections from a conversation between the characters Dr. Dolittle and his parrot 
Polynesia.
CHAPTER 1: General Introduction
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 While there is a clear divide between human language and cognition and the 
communicative and cognitive systems by which other species function, research has 
yet to fully connect the dots to create a clear picture of just what that gap might 
comprise. Even less  is known about how those systems found in animals develop 
and function in their natural state.  
Core Knowledge Theory
 A prominent psychological theory on early cognitive development is Spelke’s 
Core Knowledge (CK) hypothesis (Spelke et al., 1992), which posits that human 
infants, and possibly other species, are guided by innate understandings of how 
object movements, classification and quantification are governed by physical laws 
and, further, how agents are capable of perceptions and purposive action. CK is a 
set of cognitive building blocks, which serve as the foundation for more complex 
cognition such as  acquisition and use of symbol systems pertaining to language and 
mathematics (Spelke, 2000). 
 Evidence points  to four core systems of knowledge: representation of number, 
object, space (or geometry) and agency. Each system is  defined by a set of cognitive 
signatures (sometimes referred to as  “constraints” or “limits”) that identifies its 
functioning in tasks  across variables such as age, gender, species or culture (Spelke 
& Kinzler, 2007). Research suggests that these core systems are domain specific, 
task specific, and relatively encapsulated and automatic (not susceptible to explicit 
belief reasoning) (Von Bayern & Emery, 2009). In spite of the proliferation of 
evidence on CK in the human and nonhuman primate lineage (Hanus & Call, 2007; 
Hauser, MacNeilage, & Ware, 1996), a detailed understanding of precise way in 
which these core systems manifest themselves in other species of nonhuman 
animals bears  continued exploration. Furthermore, investigation of spontaneous CK 
in the wild is  fundamental to understanding the ecological validity and evolutionary 
context for a set of systems that is proposed to be universally embedded (Emery et 
al., 2005). 
 To date, establishing both experimental and ethological significance of CK has 
been rarely achieved because researchers face significant logistical difficulties 
working with wild animals as compared to trained, captive subjects 
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(McComb, Packer, & Pusey, 1994). The bold, inquisitive manner and naïve 
fearlessness of wild North Island robins (Petroica longipes) presents a unique 
opportunity to identify and characterise CK in a new model system (Menzies & 
Burns, 2008).
 A cognitive domain represents  a given system operating within a finite, context-
specific computational problem space, in which a psychological mechanism only 
becomes engaged when faced with specific types of scenarios. Each system 
operates by picking out certain relevant ‘signature characteristics’ (and rejecting 
others) using specialised learning mechanisms (Flombaum, Santos, & Hauser, 
2002). 
 Number representation. With respect to number, several competing proposed 
paradigms have postulated differing sets  of principles to define this system 
(Changeux & Dehaene, 1989; Church & Broadbent, 1990; Meck & Church, 1983). 
However, at least two basic models have been postulated among others; a single 
continuum of representation, subject to scalar variability (Cordes, Gelman, Gallistel, 
& Whalen, 2001), and a dual mechanism system operating object file/subitizing 
system for small numbers, and a magnitude representation system for larger 
numbers (Dehaene, Dehaene-Lambertz, & Cohen, 1998). The object-file system 
computes numerical differences on the basis of one-to-one correspondence, but 
there appears to be a capacity limit of 3 to 4 objects to which file tokens may be 
assigned at any one time (Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994). Performance in situations that 
exceed the limits of object-tracking system (e.g., discriminating 16 from 32 vs. 16 
from 24) show that human infants and primates’ numerosity judgments display the 
Weber-fraction signature of scalar variance. The cognitive signature of the 
magnitude representation system is that the ratio of two values determines 
discriminability. 
 Despite disagreement on the larger set of principles defining the domain of 
number, or precise deployment of multiple mechanisms, there is consensus over 
three signature features of number representation. First, number representations are 
imprecise in nature, and noise increases in a linear manner with cardinal value, and 
a ratio limit appears as a result of scalar variability which serve to constrain 
discriminability of sets containing different values  (Gallistel & Gelman, 2000; Izard & 
Dehaene, 2008). Second, addition and subtraction can be used to compare and 
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combine number representations (Brannon, Wusthoff, Gallistel, & Gibbon, 2001). 
Third, number representations are abstract regardless  of item characteristics: they 
apply to any range of articles experienced through multiple sensory inputs, including 
auditory sequences, visual arrays of objects or light, and perceived or sequences of 
motion or action. Pigeons and primates, for example, can both acquire abstract 
numerical rules such as ascending ordinal sequence (Scarf, Hayne, & Colombo, 
2011; Scarf, Danly, Morgan, Colombo & Terrace, 2011; Scarf & Colombo 2008). 
Using direct comparison within the same experimental group, subjects rely on the 
same numerical system for food and inherently non-valuable tokens (Addessi, 
Crescimbene, & Visalberghi, 2008; Carey, 1998; Feigenson, Carey, & Hauser, 2002).
 Object representation. With respect to object representations, experiments on 
tracking and directed reaching reveal that human infants and primates reason about 
the motion of animate and inanimate kinds by way of two signature constraints: 
principle of cohesion (objects are connected bodies that maintain their 
connectedness as they move) and principle of continuity (objects  move only on at 
least one connected path) (Hood, Hauser, Anderson, & Santos, 1999; Spelke et al., 
1992). Object representation is governed by a set of signature spatio-temporal 
principles inapplicable to agents. First, principles of continuity dictates that objects 
will move on unobstructed connected paths (Aguiar & Baillargeon, 1999). Second, 
principles of cohesion determines that objects will move as bounded whole (Leslie & 
Keeble, 1987; Valenza, Leo, Gava, & Simion, 2006). Third, principles of physical 
contact observe that objects do not interact at a distance (Spelke, 1990). These 
features enable humans and animals  to predict when and where objects will move or 
come to rest, perceive the boundaries of objects within a field of view, and conceive 
shape representations for objects that move out of view (Regolin, Vallortigara, & 
Zanforlin, 1995; Santos, 2004; Valenza et al., 2006).
 Objects  in natural settings (human or nonhuman) are seldom found standing in 
isolation from one another, in continuous full view, or against a homogeneous 
background. For that reason, perception and representation are of objects  in shifting, 
cluttered arrays rather than in isolated, static or homogeneous environments is 
particularly relevant to fully understanding an object representation system (Spelke, 
1990). The ability to perceive objects in a rich diverse and changing environment 
requires processing features beyond those of surface layout to capture the 
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underlying arrangement of structures that compose geometrical layout (Spelke, 
1990), which ties  directly into spatial representation abilities. Despite evolutionary 
divergence and differences in neural architecture, avian visual perception and 
complexity appears to show both mechanistic and behavioural similarities (Cook, 
2000), such as the ability to generalise visual features when categorising (von 
Fersen & Delius, 1989), and construct a generalised concept of a location or object 
based on multiple differing viewpoints (Cook, 2000; Honig & Stewart, 1988). 
Behavioural evidence suggests that some avian visual acuity may exceed that of 
humans in certain contexts, for example, pigeons show no lag in reaction time for 
visual searches of reversal of features (Allan & Blough, 1989), and no increased 
reaction time judging object identity when presented at different angles of orientation 
(Hollard & Delius, 1982), suggesting a greater capacity to mentally rotate objects and 
visual information than primates.
 Agent representation. Research on agency representation in CK reveals two 
consistent processing signatures with respect to making inferences from social-
perceptual cues. In cooperative object choice paradigms, where subjects have to 
spontaneously read and use eye gaze to find the location of a hidden food, human 
infants pass while primates and corvids  fail (e.g., Schloegl, Kotrschal, & Bugnyar, 
2007). In competitive foraging paradigms, however, primates and corvids “steal” 
more food from a conspecific or heterospecific competitor who is glancing away or 
whose eyes are closed than from one who is  visually aware (e.g., Carter, Lyons, 
Cole, & Goldsmith, 2008). Agency in terms of corvid cache protection strategy 
(Bugnyar & Heinrich, 2006; Emery, Dally, & Clayton, 2004) and anticipation of 
conspecific reaction (Emery & Clayton, 2008) takes  place within a competitive 
setting.
 Distinguishing signature characteristics  of agent representation are exactly those 
which do not define objects: goal-directedness, efficiency, contingency, reciprocity, 
and gaze direction (all of which are defining principles for nonhuman animals and 
humans alike) (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007). According to Woodward(1999), agency 
involves actions directed to outcomes (goals), and agents achieve their goals 
through means that are efficient and rational (Gergely & Csibra, 2003). Agents also 
interact contingently (Johnson, Booth, & O'Hearn, 2001; Watson, 1972) and 
reciprocally (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977). Newly hatched chicks, rhesus monkeys, and 
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chimpanzees are sensitive to what their predators or competitors can and cannot 
see (Agrillo, Regolin, & Vallortigara, 2004; Flombaum & Santos, 2005; Hare, Call, & 
Tomasello, 2001) Studies  such as these are consistent with the physiological 
signatures of ‘mirror neurons’, which have been observed in captive monkeys and 
selectively respond to specific actions performed both by the self and others 
(Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2008). 
 Spatial representation. The overarching signature characteristic of spatial 
representation in humans and nonhuman animals (e.g. rats, desert ants, birds, etc.) 
alike is the ability to navigate or orient either themselves, or the location of an object 
within an area, based on geometric information in the environment, using shape as 
an indicator (Hermer & Spelke, 1994).  Non-geometric features do not appear to be 
universal in their utilisation; whereas adult humans take into account non-geometric 
information (e.g., surface colour), young children, rats and other species do not, 
even when that information is represented (Cheng, 1986; Hermer & Spelke, 1996).
 A more flexible spatial reorientation on the basis of surface cues (e.g., colour) or 
integrating geocentric and non-geometric cues may draw specifically on the unique 
compositionality of natural human language (e.g., Cheng, 1986; Gallistel, 1990; 
Spelke, Gentner, & Goldin-Meadow, 2003). In the absence of language, however, 
arboreal monkeys living in changing rainforest environments do integrate metric 
relations between spatial elements with landmark information under certain 
conditions (e.g., Townsend, Clark, McGowan, & Lovette, 2009). Orientation and 
navigation in avians appear to rely on both geometric and non-geometric information, 
enabling them to orient to angles  of a location they have not yet been exposed to 
(Honig & Stewart, 1988), and orientate and locate items in an array (Chiesa, 
Speranza, Tommasi, & Vallortigara, 2006). A geometric CK domain may turn out to 
privilege only geometric cues or both geometric and non-geometric cue information 
depending on phylogenetic differences, experimental or developmental factors. 
Research over instinctive agent representations  in human and animals is expansive 
given that reasoning about mental states involves many component skills (Call & 
Tomasello, 1999; Krachun, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2009; Low, 2010). 
 In recent years, the cognitive milestones that shape our understanding of 
uniquely human capacities have shifted dramatically as new evidence is found that 
continually redefines our perception of both universal and specialised cognitive 
7
function. Finding core areas of knowledge that function cognitively in a unilateral way 
across species with as  distant as birds and mammals, speaks to the evolutionary 
significance of just how early these fundamental building blocks may have arisen.
Cognition in the Wild
 Two distinct traits are common across the set of four CK domains of number, 
object, agency and spatial geometry which comprises the neural and cognitive 
mechanisms that form the basis of more complex psychological skills: First, they are 
common to infants, children and adults, and emerge early in human development. 
Second, they evolved before humans and so are shared with other species (Hauser, 
Spelke, & Gazzaniga, 2004).
 Animal cognition research uncovering evidence supporting CK ‘signature’ limits  is 
fundamentally underpinned by research with primates (Boysen & Berntson, 1989; 
Feigenson & Carey, 2005; Santos, 2004; Spelke, 1990). There is a range of 
supporting studies on number representation in rats, fish, pigeons and, more 
recently, invertebrates  (e.g., Agrillo, Dadda, & Bisazza, 2007; Carazo, Font, Forteza-
Behrendt, & Desfilis, 2009; Honig & Stewart, 1989; Uller, Jaeger, Guidry, & Martin, 
2003; von Fersen & Güntürkün, 1990). 
 Other forms of CK – reasoning about object physics and agent mental life – have 
yet to be comprehensively examined in a non-primate context. Fewer studies on CK 
in non-mammals  address ethological relevance, evolutionary or species-specific 
implications. Evidence of parallel cognitive complexity in some avian species (e.g., 
brood-parasitic cowbirds, scrub jays, crows) point to birds as being prime candidates 
for examining ultimate causes  (e.g., the adaptive value of cognitive and social 
reasoning) and proximate mechanisms (e.g., whether and how CK competencies 
change with age and map onto neurobiological structures) that result in behaviour 
production (e.g., Clayton, 1995; Low, Burns, & Hauber, 2009). Demands on food 
caching in corvids, for example, necessitate complex observational and episodic-like 
memory capacities compared to birds  that do not face the same pressures for storing 
and tracking food (e.g., Bednekoff, Kamil, & Balda, 1997; Clayton, Emery, & 
Dickinson, 2006a). The adaptive pressures surrounding food caching and pilfering 
may give rise to CK abilities in certain avian brains (Hunt, Low, & Burns, 2008; Low 
et al., 2009).
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 Cognition in wild animals is by its nature a difficult field of research. The vast 
majority of species on the planet are unsuited for an experimental study examining 
cognition simply because engaging the animal is extremely challenging – particularly 
when the human experimenter is naturally a predator or prey of a given species. 
Making observations at close range can also present a problem; many of the studies 
of species done in their natural habitat must sometimes done at a considerable 
distance (Marzluff, Walls, Cornell, Withey, & Craig, 2010; McComb et al., 1994). 
New Zealand Robins
 The subjects in this  study were wild North Island robins (see Figure 1); an 
endemic passerine whose populations  are largely limited to protected forest areas 
(Armstrong & Ewen, 2002; Armstrong et al., 2002; Armstrong, Raeburn, Lewis, & 
Ravine, 2006a, 2006b). Robins live in mated pairs, defending a given territory within 
which they hunt primarily for invertebrates, cache food, and raise young 
(Powlesland, 1980). They are a food hoarding species that cooperate to provision 
young during the summer nesting season, and display conflict and competition for 
food resources with varying rates of aggression year-round (Steer & Burns, 2008). 
Pilfering, relocating and redistributing both pilfered and self-hunted prey is  present in 
both males and females; however, differing rates of retrieval have been observed 
between the sexes (Burns & Van Horik, 2007). 
 The population of robins tested in this study is found within a native wildlife 
sanctuary forest (Zealandia) in Wellington, New Zealand. This sanctuary is  controlled 
for introduced predators  (such as cats, rats and stoats) using predator-proof fencing 
and baited traps, to protect native bird populations within the sanctuary from 
predation. Approximately 225 hectares in area, Zealandia is  covered primarily in 
native broadleaf forest and encompasses a deep valley ranges from 140m to 358m 
in elevation.  As of 2008, it housed a population of approximately 150 colour-banded 
birds, and a total population estimated to just below 600 birds (McGavin, 2009). 
Robins, like other endemic birds of New Zealand, have evolved in the absence of 
terrestrial mammals and are particularly susceptible to predation due to naïve 
behaviour seen many isolated island populations (Menzies  & Burns, 2010). This 
naïve response to terrestrial mammals, in combination with food-hoarding and 
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pilfering behaviour, makes an ideal wild candidate for comparative cognition 
research eliciting spontaneous responses.
 New Zealand robins are one of a very small number of food-hoarding birds in the 
Southern Hemisphere (Vander Wall, 1990). Robins are monogamous and mated 
pairs reside on exclusive territories year-round (Burns & Steer, 2006), as seen on the 
map of territories in Figure 2. This species is a medium-sized insectivorous 
passerine that is endemic to New Zealand, and found both on the North and South 
Island. Like many other animals native to isolated oceanic islands, robins lack 
pronounced anti-predatory behaviours and are fearless of humans. They will 
consume and cache foods offered to them by hand, and readily attend to and 
interact in experimental paradigms without extensive familiarisation or training (Hunt 
et al., 2008). They show complex cognitive abilities in creating, protecting and 
retrieving caches.  Robins cache food in numerous different sites, regularly caching 
more than one item in each site. Further, when robins retrieve their own or pilfer their 
mates’ caches, they fly to the exact location of these cache sites, even after leaving 
them for significant periods of time – suggesting accurate observational spatial 
memory (see Menzies & Burns, 2008, for a review). Examining numerosity 
discrimination in a scatter-hoarding songbird may uncover what roles phylogeny, 
ontogeny and ecology play in shaping universal and species-specific features in the 
cognitive mechanisms underlying quantity representation.
 The Petroicidae family of Australo-Papuan robins has a relatively small handful of 
members inhabiting New Zealand, including the New Zealand robin (Petroica 
australis), the tomtit (Petroica macrocephala), and the Chatham Island black robin 
(Petroica traversi) among others. While the North Island robin was previously 
classified as a subspecies of the subspecies  of the New Zealand robin using the 
nomenclature Petroica australis longipes (Fleming, 1950), more recent evidence 
based on mitochondrial DNA suggests  that North Island robins are in fact a distinct 
Petroica subspecies (Holdaway, Worthy, & Tennyson, 2001; Miller & Lambert, 2006), 
more accurately called Petroica longipes. For the purposes  of these studies, which 
focus entirely on behavioural aspects of cognition, the minimal ecological and 
geographical differences  between New Zealand and North Island robins  are a 
distinction that is functionally irrelevant to the present context. This  is especially true 
as important and salient behavioural features exist in both species, such as caching, 
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pilfering, defence of stable territories, and pair bonding. Future studies looking at 
possible variations in behavioural or cognitive features among sub-groups that differ 
geographically, and genetically, would certainly add interesting and valuable 
ecological context to this species contribution in the growing body of literature that 
informs ecology, cognition and evolution as a whole.
Figure 1: An adult mated pair of North Island robins (Petroica longipes)
 The New Zealand robin is  in many ways ideal as a model system for cognitive 
mechanisms in a naturalistic setting, using behavioural experimentation in the wild. 
As a species, the biological naiveté displayed is  not as linear as one might think. The 
mainland robin population that remained (such as it was) did display responses to 
predators on mainland areas of the North Island to some extent (Maloney & McLean, 
1995), but have been found to quickly unlearn such behaviour in predator-free 
environments, showing almost no response within a single generation of relocation 
(Whitwell et al., 2011). Successful reintroduction of robins (along with other species) 
into off-shore islands and mainland reserves has seen largely successful breeding 
and re-population of these areas (Hanus & Call, 2007; Taylor, Jamieson, & 
Armstrong, 2005; Armstrong et al., 2002) but little to no behavioural defences 
(Whitwell et al., 2011).
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Figure 2: A map of robin territories in one portion of the sanctuary.
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Research Questions
 A total of 43 individual robins took part in the studies described here (see 
Appendix A), ranging in approximate age at testing from less than 1 to 11 years. 
Individuals  inhabited a range of the Zealandia Sanctuary along the eastern edge of 
the fenced forest reserve, close to the sanctuary entrance on the north end. Transect 
lines with markers and bait-stations were used in identification and documentation of 
robin territories and nesting sites (see Figure 2).   
 The objective of the suite of studies presented here is to establish whether the 
different core knowledge domains are similarly observed in the New Zealand robin 
and, further, whether there may be differences in the defining cognitive signatures in 
avian CK that reveal the species’ divergent evolutionary history and unique 
ecological niche. The primary research questions  are addressed by six studies, 
focused on two of the four core cognitive areas: Numerosity and Agency.
 The first three studies address various  features of numerosity in robins, asking 
several questions regarding robins’ abilities to discriminate and compute varying 
quantities. How accurately do robins distinguish small and large quantities of prey 
items, and either ratio or numerical distance factors? Is the quantity discrimination 
ability of robins influenced or altered by spatially distributing the locations of two 
different quantities across multiple hidden arrays? Are robins able to successfully 
perform simple mathematical computations by responding differently to addition and 
subtraction of prey that is consistent or inconsistent with what they see?
 The following three studies address several aspects of agency representation, 
and explore a number of questions about robins’ capacity for responding to visible 
social cues in an evolutionarily distant and invasive species – humans. Can robins 
make pilfering decisions by taking into account the gaze of heterospecifics? Do 
robins make pilfering decisions  by taking into account the visibility of limbs in 
heterospecifics? Do robins respond to cache retrieval and pilferage of live, paralysed 
or dead prey of various kinds differently depending on the species, mobility and 
animacy of the prey?
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CHAPTER 2: Study 1 – Discrimination of Large and Small Quantities2
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2 Contents from this chapter have been published as “Large quantity discrimination by North Island 
robins (Petroica longipes)” in Animal Cognition (2012) by Garland, Low & Burns
 Quantity discrimination is fundamental to numerical cognition and considered an 
ability that is at the root of symbolic counting (Carey & Williams, 2001; Gallistel & 
Gelman, 1992). Not surprisingly then, studies examining relative quantity judgments 
(RQJs) have been conducted with human infants and adults (e.g., Barth, Kanwisher, 
& Spelke, 2003; Feigenson et al., 2002) and primates (e.g., Beran & Beran, 2004; 
Hanus & Call, 2007; Wynn, Cummins, & Allen, 1998) as well as other species 
ranging from insects to elephants (e.g., Agrillo, Dadda, Serena, & Bisazza, 2008; 
Carazo et al., 2009; Irie-Sugimoto, Kobayashi, Sato, & Hasegawa, 2009; Meck & 
Church, 1983). 
 Non-linguistic number sense is understood to exist in humans and animals in two 
distinct systems; an indexing system, which processes or stores “object files” with a 
strict capacity limit of three to four items, and an analog magnitude system used in 
approximating larger numbers (Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994; Uller, Hauser, & Carey, 
2001). Weber’s  law appears to play a fundamental role in the underlying mechanism 
with which the perception of large numbers is approximated (Cantlon, Platt, & 
Brannon, 2009; Gallistel, Gelman, Holyoak, & Morrison, 2005). According to this law, 
the size of the smallest perceptible difference in stimulus intensity varies as a 
function of a proportion of the original magnitude of that stimulus (Jordan & Brannon, 
2006). Within the framework of an analog magnitude system, ratio is  the primary 
predictor of accuracy in discriminating between different quantities. There is  still 
debate over whether there are two distinct core number systems. Some studies with 
monkeys and human infants support different cognitive signatures  governing small 
versus large numbers (Feigenson, Dehaene, & Spelke, 2004) whilst other studies 
have found that a singular mechanism based on Weber’s  law accounts for RQJs 
across a wide range of numerosities (e.g., Beran, 2001; Cantlon & Brannon, 2006). 
 Despite increasing comparative research interest in quantity discrimination, 
understanding the ecological factors that determine when and how mental 
representations of quantity are deployed remains a challenge that needs to be 
addressed (Dehaene, Izard, Spelke, & Pica, 2008; Emery & Clayton, 2004; 
Feigenson et al., 2002). The goal here was to investigate spontaneous quantitative 
cognition skills in wild New Zealand robins, specifically North Island robins (Petroica 
longipes), an endemic species of New Zealand (Hunt et al., 2008). The bulk of the 
data on spontaneous numerical discrimination is still primate and mammal centric 
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(Carazo et al., 2009; Dadda, Piffer, Agrillo, & Bisazza, 2009; Uller et al., 2003). 
Considering the evolutionary distance of birds and mammals, examining RQJs in a 
scatter-hoarding songbird will contribute to a more phylogenetically diverse picture of 
numerical cognition (Beran, 2008; Clayton, 1995). There is  work on numerical 
abilities in birds, but they involve considerable amounts of training and/or relate 
primarily to discrimination of sets with small sizes (Farnsworth & Smolinski, 2006; 
Honig & Stewart, 1989; Koehler, 1941; Pepperberg, 2006; Rugani, Regolin, & 
Vallortigara, 2008; Terrace, 1987). However convincingly studies demonstrate animal 
learning and cognition after extensive training, interpreting what the findings  mean in 
terms of animals’ natural ability to represent number remains difficult (Davis & 
Pérusse, 1988; McComb et al., 1994). 
 There are some studies that hint at wild birds’ adaptive number sense. For 
example, American coots experience nest parasitism from conspecific females, and 
egg number combined with recognition contribute to clutch size decisions. Lyon 
(2003) found that female coots that discriminated parasitic eggs from their own 
counted only their own eggs and thus avoided inadvertent clutch size reductions. 
Quantity discrimination has  also been suggested to partly underpin Brown-headed 
cowbirds’ (Molothrus ater, an obligate brood parasite) synchronisation of nest 
parasitism with host incubation readiness. White, Ho, and Freed-Brown (2009) found 
that cowbirds spent longer periods investigating nests with the correct accumulated 
number of eggs in relation to elapsed days, suggesting that cowbirds appear to 
remember changes in egg-number between visits. The few studies on number 
cognition in wild birds have, however, focused on only a narrow range of numerical 
values and with small set sizes (Farnsworth & Smolinski, 2006; Low et al., 2009). 
Some of these sets  are still relatively ‘large’ in terms of being above object-file 
threshold of 3 to 4 items, but not substantially large enough to establish whether 
there is a sophisticated upper limit to birds’ number discrimination or what 
representational system could underpin such capacities. This is  important to address 
when assessing numerosity in birds where certain food-storing species  have been 
shown to display significant spatial attention and memory skills (Clayton, Dally, 
Gilbert, & Dickinson, 2005; Hunt et al., 2008). 
 North Island robins, the species of the current study, are one of a very small 
number of food-hoarding birds in the Southern Hemisphere (Vander Wall, 1990). 
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Robins are monogamous and mated pairs reside on exclusive territories year-round 
(Burns & Steer, 2006). This species is a medium-sized insectivorous  passerine that 
is  endemic to New Zealand, and found both on the North and South Island. Like 
many other animals  native to isolated oceanic islands, robins lack pronounced anti-
predatory behaviours and are fearless  of humans. They will consume and cache 
foods offered to them by hand, and readily attend to and interact in experimental 
paradigms without extensive familiarisation or training (Hunt et al., 2008). They show 
complex cognitive abilities in creating, protecting and retrieving caches. Robins 
cache food in numerous different sites, regularly caching more than one item in each 
site. Further, when robins  retrieve their own or pilfer their mates’ caches, they fly to 
the exact location of these cache sites, even after leaving them for significant periods 
of time – suggesting accurate observational spatial memory (see Menzies & Burns, 
2008, for a review). Examining numerosity discrimination in a scatter-hoarding 
songbird may uncover what roles phylogeny, ontogeny and ecology play in shaping 
universal and species-specific features in the cognitive mechanisms underlying 
quantity representation. 
 Initial RQJ testing by Hunt et al. (2008) indicated that robins chose the cache site 
with greater number more than half the time with comparisons involving 1 vs. 2, 2 vs. 
3, 3 vs. 4, 4 vs. 5, and 4 vs. 8, but chose at chance or below with 4 vs. 6; and 6 vs. 8 
and 8 vs. 10. Their analysis indicated that total set size rather than ratio predicted 
the accuracy of robins’ numerical judgments. Precise numerical judgments could 
potentially form an integral part of robins’ cache retrieval strategy. If robins  are able 
to compute precisely how many pieces of prey items are in each of its (and its 
mates’) cache sites, it would help prioritise efficient cache retrieval and pilfering 
(Burns & Steer, 2006). Moreover, given that robins  only store insect prey that are 
highly perishable, tracking and remembering the precise number of items stored in 
particular cache sites would help prioritise cache retrieval to minimise losses to 
spoilage. Hunt et al.’s findings are illuminating in their contrast with work on primates 
and human infants showing that the object-file system, whilst capturing performance 
with small sets, cannot process quantities greater than 3 or 4 items simultaneously. 
The results suggest that robins  – in the context of food-storing and food-retrieval 
demands – may have developed an object indexing system with a higher upper limit. 
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 In relation to the present study, though, it is still not clear whether robins have 
relatively sophisticated discrimination of numbers in an absolute sense, or whether a 
single fuzzy analog magnitude system for recognising all quantities – large or small – 
underpins RQJs. First, in Hunt et al.’s (2008) study, all comparisons with ratios at 
0.50, half at 0.67 and 0.75 and none at 0.80 were significant. This suggests that 
ratio, to some extent, may influence robins’ numerosity discrimination, but it was 
undetected due to the limited range of comparisons being examined. Second, Hunt 
et al. tested RQJs by presenting the two sets of quantities  item-by-item whereby the 
totality of items was never visually available at the time of cache selection, as prey 
was dropped into opaque containers and subsequently covered. Research indicates 
that apes (Hanus & Call, 2007) and South American sea lions (Abramson, 
Hernández-Lloreda, Call, & Colmenares, 2011) are poorer at spontaneously 
selecting the larger value when the two sets of quantities were presented item-by-
item compared to when the two quantities are presented simultaneously as  visually 
accessible whole sets. Importantly, ratio between quantities was found to account for 
apes and sea lions’ spontaneous RQJ performance – analog magnitude 
representations appear to be especially favoured when items are visibly presented 
as a united set (see Shettleworth, 2009). 
 There is compelling evidence in some studies (Beran, 2001, 2004) that 
chimpanzees are able to make highly accurate RQJs (70-95% correct) even when 
larger numbers of food items are sequentially presented and hidden from view (5 vs. 
8, 5 vs. 10, and 6 vs. 10). However, as Beran notes (2004), it is not clear whether 
certain subjects’ rich history of participation in numerical and other cognitive tasks 
may have scaffolded their ability to update and retain quantity information when sets 
are sequentially presented. Overall, while each of these methods (quantities 
presented simultaneously as whole sets or quantities  presented item-by-item) has 
been frequently used to test animals’ RQJs, there are few systematic comparisons of 
spontaneous performance between these two types of tasks (Abramson et al., 2011; 
Hanus & Call, 2007). It is  noteworthy that wild robins in Hunt et al.’s study could 
make RQJs successfully in a cognitively demanding task context where the item-by-
item presentation meant that the birds had to deal with temporal discontinuity 
between prey items. Hunt et al. have suggested that an extended upper limit to 
robins’ parallel individuation of food items may reflect these birds’ sensory, motor, 
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cognitive and neuroanatomical specialisations in behaviour for scatter-hoarding, 
pilfering and retrieving food. However, emphasising a sophisticated object indexing 
system operating in robins instead of a generalised and evolutionarily primitive 
Weber-based magnitude representation system may be premature.   
 Comparing robins’ RQJs across different sets  of quantities  (high and low 
numbers weighted across the ratio scale) and in different task contexts  (item-by-item 
and simultaneous presentation of visually accessible whole sets) can help uncover 
the commonality and diversity in the nature of the cognitive representations 
governing robins’ quantitative judgments. The aim was to test whether robins 
converged with other species in having both object-file representations and analog 
magnitude representations, yet may diverge in terms of when limits in precise 
discrimination are imposed and when fuzzy Weber’s law-based discrimination of 
quantities are deployed. 
 Three experiments were carried out to test robins’ spontaneous  RQJs and 
investigate what representational systems could characterise their abilities. 
Experiment 1 tested robins’ RQJ using an item-by-item paradigm where 10 different 
number pair comparisons (from 1 vs. 8 to 14 vs. 16) were combined with 5 different 
ratios (from 0.125 to 0.875), so that the total number of worms remained hidden from 
view as each robin made its choice. Experiment 2 presented the same number 
comparisons (and ratio range) to a new group of robins, by pouring the two sets of 
worms simultaneously, so two quantities remained visually accessible at the time of 
choice. In Experiment 3 another new group of robins  were tested on RQJs with the 
same visually accessible context in Experiment 2, using number comparisons 4 to 8 
times larger than those presented in the first two experiments (see Table 1). An 
analysis across all three experiments was  conducted, examining the effects of ratio 
between pairs of quantities and total set size across pairs of quantities to contrast 
the analog magnitude and object indexing systems.
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Table 1. Number comparisons and total number of worms displayed for each trial for 
the 5 ratios investigated across Experiments 1, 2 and 3.
Ratio Experiments 1 & 2 Experiment 3
Comparison Total Comparison Total 
0.125
1 vs. 8 9 4 vs. 32 36
2 vs. 16 18 8 vs. 64 72
0.250
1 vs. 4 5 8 vs. 32 40
2 vs. 8 10 16 vs. 64 80
0.500
4 vs. 8 12 16 vs. 32 48
8 vs. 16 24 32 vs. 64 96
0.750
3 vs. 4 7 24 vs. 32 56
6 vs. 8 14 48 vs. 64 112
0.875
7 vs. 8 15 28 vs. 32 60
14 vs. 16 30 56 vs. 64 120
Methods
 Subjects. Twelve individual robins  participated in each experiment (36 robins  in 
total). No subject participated in more than one of the three experiments  described 
below. Each subject was identified with the unique combination of coloured bands on 
the bird’s  legs (see Figure 3). None of the robins used in this study had prior 
experimental history. This  study was conducted in native New Zealand forest within 
the Karori Sanctuary. The sanctuary is  located on the southern tip of the North Island 
of New Zealand (41°18’ S, 174°44’ E) in Karori, Wellington. As of 2008, it housed a 
population of approximately 150 colour-banded birds, and a total population 
estimated to be roughly 600 birds(McGavin, 2009). Robins used in trials were 
located auditorily and visually along a series  of footpaths or transects  traversing the 
Karori Sanctuary. 
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Figure 3. A robin makes his choice in a sequential number task.
 Materials. This  experiment examined RQJs by presenting subjects with 
mealworms (Tenebrio molitor larvae) in artificial caches comprising two plastic wells, 
sunk into a wooden encasement. The plastic lining of each well served to prevent the 
mealworms from being able to climb the rough wooden surface of the encasement, 
thus retaining even large quantities of mealworms within the encasement. Each well 
measured approximately 2 cm deep and they were spaced approximately 35cm 
apart, allowing for variations in the terrain of the individual robin’s  territory.  In 
Experiment 1, the wells were each covered with a circular brown leather flap 
approximately 7cm across. For Experiments 2 and 3, pre-counted containers of 
mealworms were poured into these wells from white plastic 35mm film canisters. No 
covers were utilised for the wells in Experiments 2 and 3.
 Procedure. Mealworm prey was presented to wild robins in an experimental 
arena containing two artificial cache sites (see Appendix C for links to example 
videos). Wild robins frequently turn over leaves in search of prey on the forest floor. 
As a result, all birds readily removed leather lids to access prey without training after 
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a brief exposure period to the experimental materials. For all three experiments, 
subjects were not positively or negatively reinforced for a specific choice, and 
allowed to retrieve mealworms for consumption or caching regardless of the choice 
made, but only from one of the two caches. The order of treatments was randomised 
in all three experiments in an attempt to control for observational learning. 
 In each experiment, 12 individual robins participated, for a total of 36 subjects 
across the three experiments, all of whom were colour-banded with unique 
identifying band combinations. Trials were conducted within the forest territory of 
each bird. Ten different number comparison spanning 5 ratios  were displayed to 
each robin (see Table 1), with the total combined number of worms displayed 
ranging from between 5 and 120 across all three experiments. The number 
combinations in these three experiments (see Table 1) were specifically chosen for 
an even and broad distribution of ratios between 0 and 1, and to create essentially 4 
tiers  of varying set sizes for each ratio, using 5 different larger set quantities (4, 8, 
16, 32, 64). There was no trial in which a choice was made and worms were not 
retrieved by the robin; every robin made a choice for the given set of 10 number 
comparisons. In all three experiments, presentation of the larger number on the right 
or left was counterbalanced and randomised, and the first number presented for 
Experiment 1 was also randomised for side (left, right) and quantity (more, less). 
 In item-by-item presentation, subjects  are unable to see either the accumulation 
in each well as prey was added, or the final amounts (singly or simultaneously), as 
the opaque containers obscured prey, and were covered upon filling. Each individual 
mealworm is  only visible as it is held in tweezers while being dropped into the well. It 
is  important to note that the visible presentation procedure in Experiments 2 and 3 
were specifically adapted for experimentation involving large quantities with a wild 
species, and prey were therefore not placed sequentially onto the platforms as in 
Experiment 1. In aiming to experiment with quantities of mealworms beyond a total 
number of 30, it was important to reduce the time it took to place the worms onto the 
platform, because in many cases, robins  will not attend to a trial for longer than 
about 60s.  To this end, pouring the worms simultaneously in trials, for example, 
using a total of 80 or 120 worms, was essential to the participation of the subjects. To 
be able to appropriately compare both of these changes in methodology (visibility 
and manner of placement), Experiment 2 was also conducted using this pouring 
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methodology and with the prey remaining visible, using the same smaller numbers 
as in Experiment 1.
 Experiment 1. Hidden quantities of mealworms were presented item-by-item, 
numbering in combined total between 5 and 30. Ten specific number combinations 
consisting of five different ratios (see Table 1) were presented to all 12 subjects 
comprising 120 trials. Mealworms were placed in each site sequentially, at an 
approximate rate of 2s per item, using metal tweezers, to prevent worms from being 
obscured as they were placed. Wells  were separately filled with between 1 and 16 
mealworms in each, and then covered. Due to the depth of the well, and the position 
of the subjects sitting low to the ground, robins  did not have visual access to the 
accumulating contents  of each well either during or after filling. The robin was then 
allowed to make a choice between the two artificial caches by removing the cover 
and retrieving the worms for consumption or storage. 
 Experiment 2. Each of the same ten number combinations and five ratios 
presented in Experiment 1 (Table 1) were simultaneously presented in whole sets to 
each of 12 different subjects. Subjects were presented with two caches, which were 
then simultaneously filled with between 1 to 16 mealworms each and remained 
visible. White plastic film canisters  were pre-loaded with a specific number of 
mealworms. Mealworms were poured into the wells using the canisters. 
 Experiment 3. The final experiment presented very large numbers (up to 64 in a 
single set) to explore the upper range of robins’ spontaneous numerosity 
discrimination ability. Ten new number combinations (Table 1) that spanned the same 
five ratios used in Experiments 1 and 2 were presented simultaneously as whole 
sets to each of 12 new birds, totalling 120 separate trials  (10 per individual). Testing 
very large number discrimination in the wild with item-by-item presentation is not 
practical: ecological necessities faced by robins – vigilant monitoring of extant food 
caches and defending of territory from intruders – make it extremely unlikely that a 
given subject will attend to a sequential presentation of up to 120 worms. The 
experimental caches were simultaneously filled with between 4 and 64 mealworms in 
each well and remained visible. White plastic film canisters were pre-loaded with a 
specific number of mealworms for each number combination. Mealworms were 
poured into the wells using identical white film canisters. The robin was then allowed 
to make a choice between the two artificial caches, and the outcome documented.
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Results
 Each of the three experiments  examined the extent to which accuracy of RQJs 
varied with ratio and total set size, and additionally a joint analysis of Experiments  2 
and 3 was  performed across all visibly presented trials. Subjects’ choice in each trial 
is  defined as ‘successful’ where the greater of the two numbers was  chosen. The 
ratio of the mealworms displayed was calculated dividing the smaller number (in one 
well) by the larger (in the second well) (e.g., 1/8 = .125). Total set size was the 
combined number of mealworms presented in both wells (e.g., 2 vs. 5 = 7). Robins 
did not appear to display a side-bias across the three experiments in making a 
choice (left 51%, right 49%).
 A binary logistic regression analysis for both ratio and set size was conducted for 
each of the 3 experiments, as well as a joint analysis of experiments 2 and 3, with 
each analysis including robin (individual subject) as a categorical variable to account 
for the within-subjects  design. There was considerable variation between individuals, 
ranging from 40% by an individual in Experiment 3 to 100% correct by two 
individuals in Experiments 1 and 2. Robin, as a variable, was never a significant 
factor in the resulting model across trials presented in either Experiment 1 (p = 
0.863, Wald = 6.149, df = 11), Experiment 2, (p = 0.985, Wald = 3.383, df = 11) or 
Experiment 3 (p = 0.348, Wald = 12.218, df = 11).
 In a binary logistic regression, the odds ratio (Exp(B) refers to the decrease in the 
dependent variable (percentage of correct RQJs), which occurs with every unit of 
increase in the independent variable (e.g., total number of worms). So for example, 
when (Exp(B)) = 0.720, the model indicates that with each unit increase – in this 
example, with every worm added to the overall number shown – the odds of a 
subject choosing correctly are reduced to a projected average of 0.72 times the odds 
of the previous comparison. This  effectively reduces the odds of success in this 
example by 28% (or 0.28 times) with every added worm – decreasing the overall 
likelihood of success as set size gets larger. 
 Preliminary analyses indicated that there was no evidence of improvement in 
accuracy across trials  in any of the three experiments (Exp. 1,  p = 0.451; Exp. 2, p = 
0.161; Exp. 3, p = 0.657), as  shown in the results  of a binary logistic regression. 
Individual robins  were therefore not significantly more or less  likely to be successful 
when responding on their tenth trial than their first; subjects’ responses were 
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spontaneous and non-reinforced as intended. Across all three experiments, few 
number comparisons were performed at chance (Experiment 2, 8 vs. 16 and 14 vs. 
16; Experiment 3, 28 vs. 32 and 56 vs. 64) or below (Experiment 3, 48 vs. 64). 
 Experiment 1. Robins’ RQJs for sequentially displayed comparisons involving 
trials with a total of 5 to 30 prey items are shown in Figure 4. Performances across 
the number combinations ranged from 58% success (14 vs. 16) to 100% success (1 
vs. 4). 
 A binary logistic regression was conducted, including individual as a categorical 
variable, and prey ratio and total set size as independent covariates, with ‘success’ 
as the dependent variable. This  revealed total set size to be a significant predictor of 
RQJ performance, (p = 0.043, Exp(B) = 0.936 Wald = 4.096, df = 1 ), whereas ratio 
was not (p = 0.533, Exp(B) = 0.577 Wald = 0.388, df = 1). The model indicated that 
with each unit increase in total set size for a number comparison, the odds were 
reduced to a projected average of 0.94 times the odds of the previous  comparison, 
slightly decreasing (by 6% with each additional worm) the overall likelihood of 
success as total set size gets larger. Further analysis of Experiment 1 is  conducted 
and explained as part of the following joint analysis section.
Figure 4. Percentage of correct trials as a function of (a) ratio and (b) total number of 
worms (combined set size), for item-by-item presentation of comparisons containing 
up to 30 total prey items (N=12).
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 Experiment 2. Robins’ RQJs  for simultaneously visible comparisons involving 
trials with a total of 5 to 30 prey items are shown in Figure 5. Percent success overall 
ranged from between 50% (8 vs. 16 and 14 vs. 16) and 92% (1 vs. 8), showing a 
slight but non- significant (t(22)=0.81, p = 0.42) overall decrease in accuracy (n = 
120, M = 72%, SD = 0.453, SE = 0.041) compared to the hidden trials of the same 
numbers in Experiment 1 (n = 120, M = 76%, SD = 0.430, SE = 0.039). 
 As in Experiment 1, the logistic regression analysing both prey ratio and total set 
size (with individual as a categorical variable), found total set size was significant (p 
= 0.034, Exp (B) = 0.936 Wald = 4.484 df = 1). The model indicated that with each 
unit increase (worm added) in total set size, the odds were reduced to a projected 
average of 0.94 times that of the previous comparison, slightly decreasing (by 6% 
with each additional worm) the overall likelihood of success as total set size 
increases. Ratio was not a significant predictor of success (p = 0.394, Exp (B) = 
0.494 Wald = 0.727 df = 1). While the model projected that the odds  would be 
reduced to 0.49 times that of the previous comparison, drastically decreasing (by 
51% with each additional worm) the overall likelihood of success as ratio increases, 
it remained a non-significant predictor of success.
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Figure 5. Percentage of correct trials as a function of (a) ratio and (b) total number of 
worms (combined set size), for whole set presentation of comparisons containing up 
to 30 total prey items (N=12).
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 Experiment 3. Robins’ RQJs for simultaneous visible comparisons involving trials 
with a total of 36 to 120 prey items are shown in Figure 6. Percent success  overall 
ranged from between 33% (48 vs. 64) to 83% (4 vs. 32 and 8 vs. 64), on the whole 
lower (n = 120, M = 63%) than Experiments 1 (n = 120, M = 76%) or 2 (n = 120 M = 
72%). The overall range of percentage of ‘correct’ decisions shows a slight decrease 
accuracy in contrast to both Experiment 1 (a significant difference, t(22) = 2.08, p = 
0.049) and Experiment 2 (non-significant: t(22) = 1.44, p = 0.17), and response 
variance increased (SD = 0.484, SE =0.440) as ratio between sets increased. 
 A logistic regression including prey ratio and total set size (with individual subject 
as a categorical variable, and ‘success’ as the dependent variable), revealed that 
ratio was a strong significant predictor of success  (p = 0.020, Exp(B) = 0.138 Wald = 
5.412, df = 1), while total set size was not (p = 0.571, Exp(B) = 0.995 Wald = 0.320, 
df = 1). According to this model, the odds  of the likelihood of making a successful 
choice is reduced to a projected average of 0.14 times that of the previous 
comparison, sharply decreasing (by 86% with each unit) the overall likelihood of 
success as prey ratio gets larger.
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Figure 6. Percentage of correct trials as a function of (a) ratio and (b) total number of 
worms (combined set size), for whole set presentation of comparisons containing up 
to 120 total prey items (N=12).
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 Joint analyses. In a joint analysis of Experiments 2 and 3, both of which used 
the same methodology of visibly presenting varying quantities of prey, ratio was a 
significant predictor of success (p = 0.009, Exp(B) = 0.220 Wald = 6.817, df = 1), 
while total set size was not (p = 0.206, Exp(B) = 0.990 Wald = 1.603, df = 1).  This 
overall result is expected, when for both high and low numbers, the model showed 
an extremely strong potential reduction in success  associated with ratio both in 
Experiments 2 (by 51% per unit change) and 3 (by 86% per unit change), although it 
was only a significant predictor in the latter. With comparison, total set size remains a 
weak effect in the models for both Experiments 2 (accuracy reduced by 6% per unit 
change) and 3 (a less than 1% drop in accuracy per unit change), although the set 
size effect was only significant in the former. 
 Most importantly, when percent success is looked at across  trials in both 
experiments (see Table 2), a pattern emerges indicating that in considering the larger 
of the two set sizes shown, success  drops significantly (t(18) = 3.780, p = 0.001; see 
Figure 6) from the percent success  of smaller sets, with a larger set size of 4 or 8 (n 
= 84, M = 77%, SD = 0.421), until the larger set size reaches 16 (n = 36, M = 58%, 
SD = 0.500) . Beyond this, a split occurs where number comparisons  with smaller 
numerical distance between the two sets  (ratios of 0.750 and 0.875) remain close to 
chance, and those with greater numerical distance (ratios of 0.125, 0.250 and 0.500) 
increase again in the percentage of successful responses. This  serves as an 
important marker for defining and analysing “small” and “large” quantities in 
reference to robins’ performance with comparison to other species, and could be 
indicative of two systems at work. 
 In order to more accurately examine how ratio and total set size affect ‘small’ and 
‘large’ numbers, experiments 1 and 2 have been reanalysed applying this new 
definition of ‘large’ and ‘small’ based on the findings of the joint analysis. To generate 
a data set of ‘small’ set sizes, all trials with a larger set size of 16 or more were 
removed, effectively reducing the definition of “small” set sizes to those where the 
larger set is  either 4 or 8 in these experiments, again using a binary logistic 
regression. To generate a data set of ‘large’ set sizes, trials from Experiment 2 and 
Experiment 3 (both of which were presented in a simultaneous, visible manner) that 
had a larger set size of 16 were used. 
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 In Experiment 1, when trials  with a larger set size of 16 or higher are removed 
from the model, neither ratio (p = 0.344, Exp(B) = 0.247 Wald = 0.895, df = 1) nor 
total set size (p = 0.393, Exp(B) = 0.903 Wald = 0.730, df = 1) are significant 
predictors  of success. Likewise, in Experiment 2, when trials  with a larger set size of 
16 or higher are removed from the model, neither ratio (p = 0.344, Exp(B) = 0.247 
Wald = 0.895, df = 1) nor total set size (p = 0.393, Exp(B) = 0.903 Wald = 0.730, df = 
1) are significant predictors of success. In Experiment 3, when trials  from Experiment 
2 with a larger set size of 16 are included in the model, again, ratio emerges as a 
strong significant predictor of success, and total set size is not significant. These 
results indicate that set sizes  below 16 square with a more object-based paradigm, 
but do not fall in line with the strict 4-item limit imposed by a typical “object-file 
system”, while numbers 16 and above are subject to a ratio-based system. 
Table 2. Percentage of correct trials across Experiments 1, 2 and 3 in both ‘small’ 
and ‘large’ comparisons.
Ratio Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Small Large Small Large Small Large 
0.125
1 vs. 8 2 vs. 16 1 vs. 8 2 vs. 16 4 vs. 32 8 vs. 64
75% 67% 92% 75% 83% 83%
0.250
1 vs. 4 2 vs. 8 1 vs. 4 2 vs. 8 8 vs. 32 16 vs. 64
100% 92% 83% 75% 58% 75%
0.500
4 vs. 8 8 vs. 16 4 vs. 8 8 vs. 16 16 vs. 32 32 vs. 64
83% 67% 75% 50% 75% 67%
0.750
3 vs. 4 6 vs. 8 3 vs. 4 6 vs. 8 24 vs. 32 48 vs. 64
75% 75% 75% 75% 58% 33%
0.875
7 vs. 8 14 vs. 16 7 vs. 8 14 vs. 16 28 vs. 32 56 vs. 64
67% 58% 67% 50% 50% 50%
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Figure 7. Percentage of correct trials as a function of the larger number of worms of 
the two quantities shown in trials of Experiments 2 and 3.
Discussion
 Robins were capable of selecting the larger of two quantities when they were 
presented item-by-item and when both were presented simultaneously as visually 
accessible whole sets. These findings extend previous work by Hunt et al. (2008).  In 
other ways, however, the findings are novel with respect to broader comparative 
RQJ research. 
 Consider the following themes in the literature. First, some studies have found 
that animals perform poorly when they have to process the sequential presentation 
of items so as to keep two sets of representations in working memory and compare 
quantities mentally (e.g., Abramson et al., 2011, with sea lions; Hanus & Call, 2007, 
with apes). Second, psychophysical representations – based on Weber’s law – are a 
clear signature of numerosity when animals are tested with quantities presented as a 
united set (e.g., Abramson et al., 2011). Third, whilst researchers have argued that 
the object-file tracking system is a better fit for capturing how animals  represent 
small numbers irrespective of their ratio, the numerical representation involved here 
has a typical set size limit of 3 to 4 items (e.g., Feigenson et al., 2004; Hauser, 2000; 
Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994). 
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 Robins’ RQJs were different on all three counts. Robins actually show slightly 
higher accuracy in selecting the larger number over a range of values – small (1 to 4) 
and large (8 to 16) – when quantities were presented item-by-item (Experiment 1) 
than when quantities  were presented simultaneously (Experiment 2). Further, while 
there was a general decline in accuracy in numerical discrimination with increasing 
objective number in each method of RQJ assessment, accuracy in both contexts 
were predicted by the total set size of the quantities and not ratio. And finally, in 
Experiments 1 and 2, robins were able to make accurate RQJs for values far 
exceeding the typical object-file system limit of around 3 to 4 items; robins  were 
accurate even for comparisons of 7 vs. 8 (Experiments  1 and 2) and 14 vs. 16 
(Experiment 1). At the very least, robins’ object indexing system appears to operate 
over an extended number range of 1 to 16, and robins are able to individuate up to 8 
or more items in parallel. Whilst a detailed unpacking of robins’ sophisticated 
numerical competence will require further research, there may be merit to Hunt et 
al.’s (2008) explanations vis-à-vis robins’ food-caching ecology. 
 Initial RQJ testing by Hunt et al. (2008) indicated that robins chose the cache site 
with greater number with comparisons involving 1 vs. 2, 2 vs. 3, 3 vs. 4, 4 vs. 5, and 
4 vs. 8, but chose randomly with 4 vs. 6; and 6 vs. 8 and 8 vs. 10. While the levels of 
accuracy in these results differ from the present study, this is  likely explained by 
methodology adapted in the experiments presented here specifically for improved 
examination of extremely large numbers. For example, one important alteration is a 
faster drop rate of 2s per worm in the present study compared to 5s in Hunt et al. 
(2008). This means that where a trial with 12 worms, for example, would be 60 
seconds in duration in the Hunt et al. (Povinelli, 2000) study, it would require only 24 
seconds to display in the present study (2.5 times faster). The advantage therein lies 
in being able to overcome difficulties with loss of interest or attention by the subject, 
particularly when presentation of prey requires longer than 40-60s, better 
maintaining full attention of the subject on the task at hand.    
 As a scatter-hoarding species, robins  need to track each prey item to its endpoint 
– from being caught, stored, shifted, pilfered, and consumed. These physical 
inventories of stored food have high turnover rate due to perishability, are 
susceptible to pilfering by mates, fledglings and neighbours, and are maintained on 
permanent year-round territories with seasonal pressures  (summer provisioning, 
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winter resource competition). Robins’ unusually high threshold for accuracy in 
quantity discrimination tasks complement evidence of neurological differences found 
not only between avian memory systems and mammals, but also between scatter-
hoarding birds  and other birds (e.g., Clayton, 1994, 1995). Of course, similar RQJ 
experiments on wild birds that do not hoard food have yet to be conducted; 
attributing the advanced numerical skills of robins to food hoarding per se remains 
speculative. That said, birds’ visual perception and spatial orientation are 
physiological systems that differ significantly from mammals and other animals 
(Cook, 2000), and are likely to play a significant role in shaping how even such 
fundamental core knowledge systems as number, geometry and object are 
evidenced in their natural behaviour. Geospatial information attached to items 
tracked by scatter-hoarding species could very well augment behavioural evidence 
of higher range object-based numerical system in such species the same way radio 
frequency identification (RFID) tags provide information enhancing a system’s  ability 
to track tagged items. For North Island robins, as scatter-hoarders, one ecological 
adaptation appears to be the use of a sophisticated number system which is  able to 
precisely identify quantities larger than 3 or 4.  
 It is  important to point out that robins’ RQJs across all three experiments could be 
influenced by cues other than numerousness, and are almost certainly likely to be 
affected by pilfering and hunting strategy specific to this species in ways that future 
experimentation will hopefully reveal in more detail. The present experiment did not 
control for cues such as  differences in dropping duration (Experiment 1) or surface 
area (Experiments 2 and 3). The findings do not definitively rule out that robins  are 
making decisions based on non-numerical cues to solve numerical problems. 
Nonetheless, it is encouraging that the findings in Experiment 1 replicate work by 
Hunt et al. (2008) where dropping duration was controlled for. Hunt et al. also 
showed that other sensory confounds  (odour and sound) do not affect robins’ RQJs. 
The attempt here was primarily to simulate problems robins might encounter in the 
wild wherein the item-by-item presentation might approximate subjects observing a 
conspecific dropping insect prey into a cache one-by-one and the whole set 
presentation might approximate subjects turning over leaf litter to discover prey 
items. As such, even though this design cedes certain experimental controls for 
gains in ecological validity, these findings still afford important comparisons with 
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other studies that have used similar protocols to measure spontaneous RQJs (e.g., 
Helme, Call, Clayton, & Emery, 2006) with sea lions, and (Hanus & Call, 2007), with 
apes). Compared to those species where fewer subjects  succeeded in the 
cognitively demanding item-by-item task context, robins were as accurate in RQJs 
with sequential presentation as  they were with presentation of whole visible sets. As 
such, new findings  have been uncovered about the representations that are at the 
root of robins’ numerical abilities.  Two systems appear to be at work when wild 
North Island robins  perceive quantity: an approximate magnitude representation 
system which is effective for very large numbers and an object indexing system 
which remains effective at substantially higher thresholds than current theory posits.
 Importantly, the current findings also support more than one mechanism 
underlying the ability to enumerate quantities in the North Island Robin. In 
Experiment 3, ratio was the only factor that significantly accounted for robins’ RQJs 
involving very large values (16 to 64) presented simultaneously. Robins were able to 
discriminate between 32 and 64 prey items (0.50 ratio) but performance dropped to 
around chance level when 24 and 32 prey items were presented (0.75 ratio). With 
respect to large numbers that exceed the standard object-file range, mosquitofish 
have also been found to discriminate contrasts  with ratios of 0.67 (8 vs. 12) but not 
ratios of 0.75 (9 vs.12) (Bisazza, Piffer, Serena, & Agrillo, 2010). The developing 
precision of the analog magnitude representation system shown in human children 
also intersects with the ratio resolution in robins: Lipton & Spelke (2003) show that 6 
month-olds can discriminate a ratio of .50 (e.g., 8 vs 16) but not .67 (e.g., 8 vs 12) 
whereas 9-month-olds can discriminate a ratio of .66 (e.g., 8vs 12) but not .80 (e.g., 
8 vs 10). As with Agrillo et al.’s  mosquitofish (2007, 2008), resolution of the ratio-
based large number discrimination in robins  parallels the resolution of the ratio-
based large number discrimination shown between that of a 9-month-old human 
infant and a human preschooler. Given the correspondence of cognitive signatures 
between species  as diverse as robins, fish and human children’s large number 
discrimination, these findings fit with the intriguing proposal that robins share with 
other species  an analog magnitude system that is inherited from a common ancestor 
(Agrillo et al., 2008; Beran, 2008; Cantlon & Brannon, 2006). 
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CHAPTER 3: Study 2 – Quantity Discrimination Across Multiple Arrays
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 Numerical competence in nonhuman species has been one of the more 
extensively researched cognitive domains to date. Perhaps  one of the most 
fundamental and widely studied quantification abilities is  relative numerousness 
judgments (RNJ), which has been demonstrated in nearly every species tested; from 
great apes, dolphins and elephants (Beran, 2007; Boysen & Berntson, 1995; 2006; 
Irie-Sugimoto et al., 2009; Jaakkola, Fellner, Erb, Rodriguez, & Guarino, 2005; Kilian, 
Yaman, von Fersen, & Güntürkün, 2003; Perdue, Talbot, Stone, & Beran, 2012) to 
pigeons, salamanders  and even beetles (Carazo et al., 2009; Emmerton, 1998; 
Krusche, Uller, & Dicke, 2010; Uller et al., 2003). Studies where subjects are asked 
to discriminate different quantities present stimuli in a broad spectrum of manners – 
using multiple sensory modes such as auditory, visual (Beran, 2012; Kilian, von 
Fersen, & Güntürkün, 2005; McComb, Packer, & Pusey, 1994), multiple media types: 
food items, tokens (Addessi et al., 2008; Beran, Evans, & Hoyle, 2011), shapes on a 
computer screen (Honig & Matheson, 1995; Krusche et al., 2010) or paper (Bogale, 
Kamata, Mioko, & Sugita, 2011; Emmerton, 1998), and multiple methods: sequential, 
simultaneous, contiguous or dispersed presentations. 
 Many quantity discrimination studies, by nature of the choice task, present 
different quantities in visible ‘arrays’, though this can describe anything from an 
assortment of food items scattered in a defined space (Study 1) (Garland, Low, & 
Burns, 2012; Krusche et al., 2010) to ordered grids of items controlled for density 
and surface area (Tomonaga, 2008). To date, however, research comparing hidden 
quantities of items have consistently been presented by being placed continuously 
into the same visually obscured location (Beran, Beran, Harris, & Washburn, 2005; 
Hanus & Call, 2007; Perdue et al., 2012). 
 There are also studies that utilise an array in which items are hidden in select 
locations, so that the locations and quantity of items is not visible to the subject. The 
majority of spatial memory tasks broaching number do so by examining the retrieval 
or identification of objects hidden within a single array (Sanford & Clayton, 2008; 
Scheid & Bugnyar, 2008), which is  sometimes rotated in orientation (Beran, 2006; 
Beran, Beran, & Menzel, 2005; Miller, Rayburn-Reeves, & Zentall, 2009). Such 
studies are primarily aimed at short or long term memory of object locations, where 
the quantity retrieved is sometimes used as a measure of success (Bednekoff & 
Balda, 1996; Gould, Ort, & Kamil, 2012). While there is a large and growing body of 
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research addressing spatial memory in many ways, little or none to date has 
addressed numeracy in terms of quantity discrimination between multiple arrays of 
hidden items. 
 Cache recovery is  an area of spatial memory research that has investigated a 
range of ecological and cognitive influence on the success and accuracy rates of 
recovery of caches in a number of avian species, including for example coal tits, 
Parus ater (Agrillo et al., 2004), chickadees, Parus atricapillus (Baker et al., 1988; 
Hitchcock & Sherry, 1990), Clark’s nutcrackers, Nucifraga columbiana (Balda & 
Kamil, 1992; Bednekoff & Balda, 1996; Bednekoff et al., 1997; Dunlap, Chen, 
Bednekoff, Greene, & Balda, 2006), jackdaws, Corvus monedula (Vander Wall & 
Balda, 1981) and ravens, Corvus corax (Bugnyar & Kotrschal, 2002), for example. 
Such a task certainly involves location and retrieval of items in an array, in a broad 
sense; either distributed throughout a given area in the field, or within an aviary room 
or specific apparatus (such as an ice cube tray). As the vast majority of such studies 
aim to observe and manipulate variables  involved in success  rates in recovering a 
cache of items hidden by the bird itself, such studies rarely appear to involve 
recovery of items hidden by the experimenter.   
 The present study presents  two discrete sets, each distributed across an array, 
where no more than one item is visible at a time. The data we obtain from these 
experiments will help us to examine two questions. First, this experiment will look at 
whether New Zealand robins can compare two sets of items, viewed one at a time 
and then hidden, and spatially distributed across an array. Second, it will examine 
whether ratio, numerical difference between quantities, and single and combined 
sums of quantities influence performance.
Methods
 Subjects. Five individual adult male robins participated in this  experiment. Each 
subject was identified with the unique combination of coloured bands on the bird’s 
legs. This study was conducted in native New Zealand forest within the Zealandia 
Sanctuary. The sanctuary is located on the southern tip of the North Island of New 
Zealand (41°18’ S, 174°44’ E) in Karori, Wellington. As of 2008, it housed a 
population of approximately 150 colour-banded birds, and a total population 
estimated to be just under 600 birds (McGavin, 2009). Robins used in trials were 
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located auditorily and visually along a series  of footpaths or transects  traversing the 
Karori Sanctuary.
 Materials. RQJs were examined by presenting subjects with mealworms 
(Tenebrio molitor larvae) in artificial caches comprising of two separate wooden 
planks, each containing an array of seven shallow, sunken wells  drilled into the wood 
and lined in clear plastic (see Figure 8). Three wells were in the row nearer the robin 
and four behind that row; rows were offset so that all wells were visible at once. Each 
wooden plank measured approximately 2cm thick, 13.5cm wide and 31cm long, and 
was natural unpainted pine. Each well measured approximately 0.5cm deep, 5cm in 
diameter, and were spaced approximately 1.5cm apart. The planks were spaced 
approximately 45cm apart, with variation due to vegetation and terrain. The wells 
were each covered during the display with two sliding covers consisting of thin brown 
pieces particleboard measuring 6cm across  and 31cm long. Upon completion of 
filling the wells, each array was completely covered with an opaque dark green 
canvas cloth, measuring 13.5cm wide and 31cm long. A pair of stainless steel 
tweezers was used to transfer the mealworms from a small, opaque white plastic 
container into the wells.
Figure 8. A robin makes a choice between two arrays. 
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Procedure. Mealworm prey was presented to wild robins in an experimental arena 
containing two experimental arrays of caches  (see Appendix C for links to example 
videos). First, the arrays and sliding covers  were placed in an appropriate location 
within the robin’s territory, and the container of mealworms placed equidistant 
between the two arrays, 0.5m towards the experimenter. The experimenter then 
used the tweezers to take mealworms from the plastic container and placed them 
randomly in 1-5 of the 7 wells on each array. For the wells left empty, the same 
motion was made with the tweezers, but without containing a mealworm. As each 
well was either filled or touched with empty tweezers, the experimenter covered the 
well immediately with the particleboard slider, so that only wells being filled and 
unfilled empty wells were within view of the subject. When all 7 wells were covered 
with the sliders, the green canvas cloth was placed over them, and the sliders were 
pulled out from beneath the cloth, allowing the subject to easily access all 7 wells 
when the cloth was removed. Subjects were then allowed to approach and remove 
one of the two cloths (by pulling it off with their beaks), and retrieve mealworms. 
Robins were allowed to retrieve and consume or cache the mealworms found 
regardless of the choice made, but only from one of the two caches. 
 The order of treatments were randomised in an attempt to control for 
observational learning. Six different quantity comparisons were displayed to each 
subject: 1 vs. 2, 1 vs. 3, 2 vs. 4, 2 vs. 3, 1 vs. 5, and 2 vs. 5.  Three birds responded 
to 9 repetitions of each comparison (54 total trials per individual), and two birds 
responded to 7 repetitions of each comparison (42 total trials per individual).  Trials 
were conducted within the forest territory of each bird.
Results
 In this experiment, first the overall results  are examined, and then the data is 
analyzed by season, comparing the data collected during nesting season with data 
collected during winter. During nesting season, males spend the predominate portion 
of their time provisioning their mate, nestlings and fledglings.
 Overall results. Overall, each robin performed significantly above chance in 
choosing the larger quantity (p < .005, binomial test; OM-RK – 71.07%; RW-OM – 
78.57%; RY-fPM – 70.37%; RM-OB – 70.37%; OM-YK – 73.81%) (see Figure 9). 
Individually, each robin performed above chance in each number comparison with 
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the exception of RY-fPM, who performed 2v3 below chance (45%) overall (see 
Figure 9). A linear stepwise regression was conducted, examining item ratio, 
numerical difference, total quantity displayed, the smaller of two quantities, and 
larger quantity as independent variables, weighted by trial count across all animals. 
The dependent variable was ‘success’, or the percent of successful choices  made by 
each subject for each comparison.  
 Only ‘smaller quantity’, or the smaller of the two quantities displayed, was found 
to be a significant predictor of RQJ performance, (F1,28 = 4.870, p = 0.036, B  = 
-0.385, df = 29). A Pearson Correlation also showed ‘smaller quantity’ significantly 
correlated with ‘success’ (r(28) = 0.683, p = 0.030). Ratio (p = 0.744), numerical 
difference (p = 0.498), total quantity (p = 0.498) and larger quantity (p = 0.498) were 
all excluded variables. One of the five robins showed a significant side bias towards 
the array on the right side from the perspective of the participating subject, (RY-fPM 
64.8%, p < .05, two-tailed binomial test).  The other four robins (OM-RK – 57.4%; 
RW-OM – 47.6%; RM-OB – 57.4%; OM-YK – 61.9%) did not differ from chance (p > .
05, two-tailed binomial test). 
Figure 9. Percentage success across all participants for all 6 number comparisons, 
overall, in winter, and in summer.
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 Seasonal Differences. Results for trials were collected during two behaviourally 
distinct seasons for robins: winter (July 2011) and summer (Oct 2010-Feb 2011), 
which is nesting season. Looking at individual subject across all summer trials, each 
robin performed significantly above chance in choosing the larger quantity (p < .05, 
binomial test; OM-RK – 80%; RW-OM – 83.33%; RY-fPM – 70%; RM-OB – 70%; 
OM-YK – 83.33%). Robins performed at RQJs significantly (N = 21, p = .000) above 
chance across all six number comparisons (see Figure 9), ranging between 66.7% 
(2v5) to 90.5% (1v3), with N=21 for each number comparison across all 5 birds. 
Three robins completed a total of 30 trials each (5 for each comparison), and two 
robins completed a total of 18 trials each (3 for each comparison). 
 Looking at individual subject across all winter trials, one robin performed 
significantly above chance in choosing the larger quantity (p < .05, binomial test; 
RW-OM – 75%), two robins performed above chance, but only approaching marginal 
significance (p = .064, binomial test; RY-fPM – 70.83%; RM-OB – 70.83%), and two 
robins did not perform significantly above chance (p > .05, binomial test; OM-RK – 
67.77%; OM-YK – 67.77%). Robins performed at RQJs significantly (N = 20, p = .
000) above chance across all six number comparisons (see Figure 9), ranging 
between 60.0% (2v3) to 80.0% (1v3 and 1v2), with N=20 for each number 
comparison including 5 birds. All five robins  completed a total of 24 trials each (4 for 
each comparison).
 A linear regression was conducted, examining the following independent 
variables: item ratio in combination with total, smaller, and larger set size, as well as 
numerical difference in combination total, smaller, and larger set size; each weighted 
by trial count. The dependent variable was  ‘success’, or the percentage of successful 
choices made by each subject for each comparison. None of the variables emerged 
as significant, either for the winter or nesting season trials. A Pearson Correlation 
also shows no significant correlations between any independent variables and 
‘success’. Results indicate no significant differences in performance across season. 
Discussion
 This  experiment presents a challenging cognitive task, requiring attention both to 
given quantities of hidden items, as well as spatial location. The data further 
illustrates an interesting difference in the performance of the North Island robin in 
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quantity tasks with comparison to most other species, in that responses did not 
predictably vary with the ratio of items. This characteristic emerged in previous 
quantity experiments  as well (see Chapter 2) (Garland et al., 2012; Hunt et al., 
2008). An experiment using added dimensions of lapsed time prior to retrieval and 
obscuring visual access also lowered success rates of a discrimination task with 
added cognitive demand (Armstrong, 2011).
 While the percentage success of this  experiment was above chance (66-85%), it 
was below performance for the the smallest comparisons presented and hidden in a 
single location in hidden trials  of Study 1 (1v4, 3v4, 1v8; 75-100% success). Robins 
appear more influenced by the total number of prey, as total (as well as  the smaller 
and larger quantities) did appear significant on a forced entry regression. For 
example, if ratio was predictive of outcome, it would be expected that robins perform 
most successfully at 1v5; if it played no role, they might perform with lower success 
at 1v5 than 1v3, where there is a lower total number of worms, but less  numerical 
distance. Robins also appeared to have a side bias for the left side of the visual field; 
another indicator differentiating this experiment with previous, less cognitively 
demanding discrimination tasks. 
 The smaller of the two numbers  presented – whether it is 1 or 2 – appears most 
significant variable for robins  (i.e. they are much more likely to choose correctly if the 
smaller number is 1 than 2). This is  interesting, as it may be indicative of a strategy 
employed for such a cognitively demanding task as the one presented here, and 
account for absence of ratio as a predictor despite lower success levels in choosing 
the greater quantity. This could further support research showing a distinction 
between single-plural sets in conditions that do not promote distinctions based on an 
approximate magnitudes (Barner, Wood, Hauser, & Carey, 2008). In a study by 
Barner et al. (2008), rhesus monkeys were able to distinguished between singular 
and plural sets 1v2, 1v5, but not two plural sets  2v3, 2v4, 2v5. Robins’ lower levels of 
success with plural sets  could provide evidence for a more basic singular-plural 
distinction in lieu of deploying mechanisms that might work more successfully at 
larger numbers, like ratio, or the more precise distinctions in tasks requiring less 
simultaneous spatial memory. 
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CHAPTER 4: Study 3 – Addition and Subtraction
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 Research on cognition in certain songbirds has challenged the belief that 
primates and human infants are the only non- or pre-linguistic animals with 
sophisticated cognitive abilities (Bugnyar & Heinrich, 2006; Emery et al., 2004; 
Taylor, Hunt, Medina, & Gray, 2009). There is still a limited understanding of avian 
numerical reasoning (Emmerton, 1998; Pepperberg, 2006; Roberts, Coughlin, & 
Roberts, 2000) and the extent to which this core system of knowledge may have 
evolved independently from the cognitive skills  of primates and humans (Beran, 
2006, 2008; Cantlon & Brannon, 2006; Feigenson et al., 2004; Hauser et al., 2004; 
Wynn, 1992, 1995; Wynn et al., 1998). This  study focuses on establishing the New 
Zealand robin as  one promising model system for understanding the evolutionary 
precursors of human mathematical ability. This experiment examines the ability to 
spontaneously compute (i.e., without training) arithmetic operations over small 
numbers of objects. 
 A variety of studies show that infants  can perform basic, non-symbolic arithmetic 
computation, such as  addition and subtraction of items (Barth et al., 2006; McCrink & 
Wynn, 2004; Wynn, 1992). Using the Violation of Expectancy (VoA) paradigm, where 
in some scenarios an ‘impossible’ outcome is revealed, Wynn (1992) demonstrated 
that five-month-olds  successfully responded to simple arithmetic operations. Infants 
were shown a certain number of toys as they were placed behind a screen, and in 
some instances the outcome was expected (e.g. 1+1=2), and in other cases the 
number revealed was unexpected (e.g. 1+1=1), and were found to look longer at 
outcomes where expectation was violated.  There remains  debate over whether 
infants are capable of perceptual processing of numerical information itself, or are 
responding to other features. A replication of the study three years later (Simon, 
Hespos, & Rochat, 1995) suggested the possibility that outcomes could be based on 
knowledge of physical object behaviour rather than underlying arithmetical ability, as 
the infants in this  study, while responding by looking longer at mathematically 
incorrect outcomes, did not look longer when the type of object hidden was switched. 
An alternative explanation is that while infants are capable of representation of 
simple arithmetic operations, the objects  of such operations are stripped of their non-
numerical features (Rugani, Fontanari, Simoni, Regolin, & Vallortigara, 2009). Cohen 
and Marks (2002) however, suggest based on further experimentation that the 
infants in Wynn’s study might be responding with familiarity preferences along with 
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the tendency to look longer at more items. While it has been shown that infants do 
respond with increased looking time to perceptually novel displays, either in item 
type (2006) or number (Slater, Bremner, Johnson, & Hayes, 2010), it does not rule 
out the use of arithmetic operations such as addition or subtraction. In contrast, it 
supports that outcomes in addition/subtraction experiments persisting despite such 
preference cannot be simply explained because of such familiarity alone. Further 
evidence shows that infants appear able to add and subtract over numbers that 
exceed object-tracking limits (McCrink & Wynn, 2004), supporting representation of 
numerical computation. 
 A number of different animal species  have also shown the ability to perform 
simple addition and subtraction of small numbers, including rhesus monkeys, 
Macaca mulatta (Hauser et al., 1996; Hauser, Tsao, Garcia, & Spelke, 2003; 
Sulkowski & Hauser, 2001), cotton-top tamarins, Sanguinus oedipus (Uller, Hauser, 
& Carey, 2001), lemurs (Eulemur fulvus, E. mongos, Lemur catta and Varecia rubra)
(Santos, Barnes, & Mahajan, 2005) and domestic dogs, Canis familiaris (West & 
Young, 2002). Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) have been shown capable of 
summing somewhat larger quantities (such as 3+4+1 or 2+2+3) (Beran, 2001). In 
Flombaum et al.’s study (Flombaum, Junge, & Hauser, 2005), rhesus monkeys also 
successfully recognised addition of larger numbers (such as  4+4=8) when using 
lemons in a VoE study. 
 Exploration of arithmetic operations in avians has been somewhat less 
investigated, however. In a study by Brannon et al. (2001), pigeons were asked to 
compare a constant number with the number remaining after a numerical 
subtraction, in a forced-choice testing phase following training. In one phase, a time-
left paradigm was presented, and in another a number-left paradigm, where for each 
it is assumed subjects are using memory to subtract their count of the tally of flashes 
shown. A study examining addition of numbers up to 6 arose spontaneously when 
Alex, a grey parrot (Psittacus erithacus) (Pepperberg, 2006), spontaneously 
answered numerical identification questions posed to another bird by tallying the 
clicks after each repeated enquiry. The resultant study revealed Alex was 
successfully able to sum numbers up to six (e.g. 5+1, 2+4, 3+2, etc.) by responding 
verbally with the correct total number when briefly shown two sets of items each 
covered with cups. 
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 Addition and subtraction of items has also been recognised in newborn chicks 
(Gallus gallus) (Rugani et al., 2009). The chicks were first imprinted on a group of 5 
plastic balls, and then exposed to a brief training session in which the chick was 
familiarised with the experimental arena and trained to follow the same type of 
plastic ball after being moved behind an occluding screen. In the testing phase of the 
final experiment, after two initial sets of five balls  (e.g. 2 and 3, or 4 and 1) were 
hidden behind two screens, some elements were visibly transferred from behind one 
screen to behind the other; for example, creating a 4-2 and 1+2 condition, where the 
screens began with 4 and 1. Chicks successfully chose the larger set of objects  after 
the addition/subtraction event regardless of directional cues due to initial or final 
movement of the objects. Such pronounced results in chicks only several days  old 
provides compelling evidence for representation of simple arithmetic operations as 
part of system of number representation in vertebrates. 
 While the rhesus monkeys presented with a choice task in Sulkowski’s (2001) 
and Flombaum & Santos’ (2005) studies were free-ranging, very little 
experimentation focusing specifically on arithmetic operations has been done with 
wild populations. This study presents a population of wild North Island robins with a 
Violation of Expectancy (VoE) task in two separate experiments. Experiment 1 
presents robins with trials  that are in some cases numerically congruent, and in other 
cases numerically incongruent. Experiment 2 presents robins with trials that are 
categorically incongruent or categorically congruent. The data from these 
experiments will attempt to examine whether North Island robins respond with 
different search times to the addition or subtraction of small numbers of prey items.
Methods
 Subjects. A total of 17 individual robins participated in this study, 7 birds in the 
first experiment and 10 birds in the second experiment. No single subject 
participated in more than one of the two experiments described below. Each subject 
was identified with the unique combination of coloured bands on the bird’s legs. 
Some of the robins used in this study had prior experimental history. This study was 
conducted in native New Zealand forest within the Zealandia Sanctuary. The 
sanctuary is located on the southern tip of the North Island of New Zealand (41°18’ 
S, 174°44’ E) in Karori, Wellington. As of 2008, it housed a population of 
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approximately 150 colour-banded birds, and a total population estimated to be 
roughly 600 birds (McGavin, 2009). Robins used in trials were located auditorily and 
visually along a series of footpaths or transects traversing the sanctuary.
 Apparatus. Trials  were performed by presenting subjects with mealworms 
(Tenebrio molitor larvae) or waxworms (Galleria mellonella larvae) in a wooden 
encasement designed for Violation of Expectancy (VoE) testing (see Figure 10). The 
box measured 9.5cm wide, 4cm tall, and 17cm long, with a thin, particleboard slider 
protruding from one side which extends out when pulled and slides  into the box 
when pushed. This slider attaches  to an upper compartment comprising a clear Petri 
dish measuring 6cm in diameter mounted on the inside of the box. The side of the 
Petri dish facing the inside of the box into which it can be pulled is covered in opaque 
black tape so that only the contents of the dish is visible when this sliding 
compartment is pushed into the box. A hole measuring 6cm in diameter on the 
surface of the box allows the subject to see either the sliding compartment (1cm 
deep), when it is pushed into the box. The well below is accessible when the sliding 
compartment is pulled out fully, and lined with the same type and size plastic petri 
dish. The plastic lining of each well served to prevent the mealworms from being 
able to climb the rough wooden surface of the encasement. The well was covered 
with a circular brown leather flap approximately 7cm across. Mealworms and 
waxworms were placed in the apparatus with stainless steel tweezers, to enable the 
clearest possible view of the prey. 
 Procedure. In both experiments, the VoE box (see Figure 10) was used with both 
the upper and lower compartments filled, regardless of whether the outcome was 
expected (items were the same in number or type) or unexpected (items differed in 
number or type). In that manner, all robins observed prey being dropped only into the 
lower compartment, and were only able to retrieve it from the upper compartment 
(see Appendix C for links  to example videos). Any change in response based on a 
perceived difference in the depth of the well, or multiple insects being contained 
therein, should be responded to both for expected and unexpected events.
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Figure 10. The VoE apparatus: Out of the bird’s  view, the upper compartment is slid 
in, (a) insects  placed inside and (b) the compartment is  slid out, hiding it. In the bird’s 
view, in the lower compartment (c) insects are placed inside, (d) the lid covers the 
well, (e) the drawer is slid in, and (f) the bird uncovers the upper compartment.3 
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3 The wooden bird in this demonstration is meant to represent the participating robin as it might view 
and interact in a given trial, in order to make all the parts of the apparatus better visible. The proximity 
of the bird to the apparatus is not reflective of an actual trial scenario.
 Robins were also exposed to neutral controls in both experiments, in order to 
account for the natural curiosity for novelty characteristic of this naive species. 
Neutral exposures consisted of displaying only the VoE box and leather flap without 
running any trial, and measuring the same variables – general attentiveness, search 
time and frequency of pecking, but without running any numerical or categorical trial, 
or placing any prey items inside or around the box.  For all trials and control 
exposures, a trial was considered ‘ended’ when the robin remained more than a 
meter away from the apparatus for longer than 20 seconds. 
 Experiment 1: Item number. Robins were shown 8 different hiding events in 
randomised order, and found 4 numerically congruent and 4 numerically incongruent 
(see Table 3). In this experiment, only mealworms (Tenebrio molitor) were used. 
Table 3. Congruent and Incongruent conditions presented in Experiment 1, altering 
item number.
Experiment 1
Congruent Incongruent
1+0=1 1+1≠1
1+1=2 2-0≠1
2-1=1 3-0≠2
3-1=2 3-1≠1
 Out of view of the experimental subject, the sliding compartment of the VoE box 
was first loaded with the number of worms intended for the robin to find (Figure 10a), 
and the sliding compartment was pulled fully out so that the contents was not visible 
(Figure 10b). The VoE box was then placed so that it was clearly visible to the 
subject, within a 1-3m distance of the robin’s  viewing position. Worms were then 
‘added’ by dropping them in clear view of the robin into the empty bottom 
compartment of the VoE box, first displaying the worm clearly for approx. 4s  by 
holding it in tweezers directly over the well, and then dropping each in with 
approximate 10s between worms (Figure 10c). 
 In some events worms were ‘subtracted’ by removing the worm from the well with 
the same approximately 10s gap, and holding it again in tweezers for approx. 4s 
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before replacing the worm into the small white 35mm film canister holding the 
remainder of the worms. The trials were only conducted with robins when they were 
on or very close to the ground, so that they were unable to see the final total of 
worms present in the bottom compartment of the box, due to depth.  The 
experimenter then covered the well with the leather cover (Figure 10d), and pushed 
the sliding compartment fully in, so that the upper compartment with the pre-loaded 
worms were the ones visible to the robin upon retrieval (Figure 10e). Lastly, robins 
were given the opportunity to approach and uncover the well, and retrieve a number 
of mealworms either consistent or inconsistent with the number of mealworms they 
observed being added or removed (Figure 10f). 
 Experiment 2: Item category. In this experiment, both mealworms (Tenebrio 
molitor larvae) and waxworms (Galleria mellonella larvae) were used. Robins  were 
shown 6 different hiding events in randomised order, and found 4 categorically 
congruent and 4 categorically incongruent (see Table 4). 
Table 4. Congruent and Incongruent conditions presented in Experiment 2, altering 
item category, where ‘m’ is mealworm, and ‘w’ is waxworm.
Experiment 2
Congruent Incongruent
1m+0m=1m 1m+1w≠2m
1m+1m=2m 1m+1w≠2w
1m+1w=1m1w 1m+1m≠1m1w
 The sliding compartment of the VoE box was first loaded with the number of 
worms intended for the robin to find, out of view of the experimental subject (Figure 
10a), and the sliding compartment was  pulled fully out so that the contents was not 
visible (Figure 10b). The VoE box was then placed so that it was  clearly visible to the 
subject, within a 1-3m distance of the robin’s  viewing position. Worms were then 
‘added’ by dropping them in clear view of the robin into the empty bottom 
compartment of the VoE box, first displaying the worm clearly for approx. 4s  by 
holding it in tweezers directly over the well, and then dropping each in with 
approximate 10s between worms (Figure 10c). The trials were only conducted with 
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robins when they were on or very close to the ground, so that they were unable to 
see the final total of worms present in the bottom compartment of the box, due to 
depth.  The experimenter then covered the well with the leather cover (Figure 10d), 
and pushed the sliding compartment fully in (Figure 10e), so that the upper 
compartment with the pre-loaded worms were the ones visible to the robin upon 
retrieval. Lastly, robins were given the opportunity to approach and uncover the well, 
and retrieve a combination of worms either consistent or inconsistent with the 
category of worms they observed being added or removed (Figure 10f).
Results
 A video analysis was performed looking at 6 different dimensions  of response 
behaviour: First, attendance duration (Attend) – the amount of time the subject spent 
within 1 meter of the apparatus, generally attending even when not actively 
searching. Second, search duration (Search) – the total amount of time the robin 
spent actively examining the apparatus or leather cover. Third, pecking frequency 
(Pecks) – the number of times the subject pecked with its beak at any part of the 
apparatus. The data was also analysed jointly (across both Experiments 1 and 2) 
looking at the destination of the prey obtained by the robin, and whether it was eaten 
immediately or removed for caching or provisioning, to examine any differences that 
might be seen in response duration as a result. 
 Experiment 1: Item number. This experiment involved hiding events using only 
one type of prey (mealworms), in which an experimenter displayed an addition or 
subtraction event where the robin found prey that was either consistent or 
inconsistent in number with the prey seen being dropped into the box. Six males and 
one female participated in this experiment. On average, robins measured higher on 
all three measures in incongruent than congruent trials (Figure 11). 
 A One-Way ANOVA was used to compare means between conditions: congruent 
trials (N=28), incongruent trials (N=28), and neutral exposures (N=14). All three 
response dimensions were all higher on average in incongruent trials (Attend = 
52.46s, Search = 42.96s, Pecks = 6.82), than neutral exposures (Attend = 50.93s, 
Search = 36.71s, Pecks = 4.71), which were in turn higher than congruent trials 
(Attend = 27.68s, Search = 23.39s, Pecks = 1.25). Of these, responses were 
significantly different: attendance duration (F (2, 67) = 4.226, p = .019), search 
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duration (F (2, 67) = 4.623, p = .013), and pecking frequency (F (2, 67) = 5.678, p = .
005).
 Independent-Samples T-Tests  were used to compare means  between each 
condition. Congruent and incongruent trials were significantly different in all three 
measures: attendance (mean ∆ 24.78s; t(54) = -2.759, p = 0.005) and search (mean 
∆ 19.57s; t(54) = -3.117, p = 0.002), and pecking (mean ∆ 5.57; t(54) = -3.204, p = 
0.000), as were neutral and congruent trials: attendance (mean ∆ 23.25s; t(40) = 
-2.657, p = 0.010) and search (mean ∆ 13.32s; t(40) = -2.013, p = 0.007), and 
pecking (mean ∆ 3.46; t(40) = -3.127, p = 0.000). While neutral exposures were on 
average lower than incongruent trials, they were not significantly so in any of the 
three measures: attendance (mean ∆ 1.53s; t(40) = 0.114, p = 0.727) and search 
(mean ∆ 6.25s; t(40) = 0.659, p = 0.807), and pecking (mean ∆ 2.11; t(40) = 0.823, p 
= 0.106).
Figure 11. Experiment 1 (Item number) – Average response in search and 
attendance time and number of pecks.
 Experiment 2: Item category. This  experiment involved hiding events using two 
types of prey – mealworms and waxworms. An experimenter displayed an addition or 
subtraction event where the robin found prey that was either consistent or 
inconsistent in type with the prey seen being dropped into the box. Eight males and 
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two females  participated in this experiment. On average, robins  measured higher on 
all three measures in incongruent than congruent trials (Figure 12). 
 A One-Way ANOVA was used to compare means between conditions: congruent 
trials (N=30), incongruent trials (N=30), and neutral exposures  (N=20). On average, 
all three response dimensions were all highest in incongruent trials (Attend = 71.13s, 
Search = 52.90s, Pecks = 4.93). Neutral exposures again, on average, fell between 
the values for congruent and incongruent trials (Attend = 55.25s, Search = 38.40s, 
Pecks = 4.80). Values for congruent trials were all lowest of the three conditions 
(Attend = 37.13s, Search = 27.07s, Pecks = 1.00). Of these, all three response 
dimensions were again significantly different between conditions in all three 
measures, including attendance duration (F (2, 77) = 3.522, p = .0349), search 
duration (F (2, 77) = 3.5403, p = .034), and pecking frequency (F (2, 77) = 5.679, p 
= .005).
Figure 12. Experiment 2 (Item category) – Average response in search and 
attendance time and number of pecks.
 Independent-Samples T-Tests  were used to compare means  between each 
condition. Congruent and incongruent trials were significantly different in all three 
measures: attendance (mean ∆ 34.00s; t(58) = -2.557, p = 0.048) and search (mean 
∆ 25.83s; t(58) = -2.619, p = 0.012), and pecking (mean ∆ 3.93; t(58) = -3.045, p = 
0.000), while between neutral and congruent trials, only pecking frequency was 
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significantly different: attendance (mean ∆ 18.12s; t(48) = -1.563, p = 0.724) and 
search (mean ∆ 11.33s; t(48) = -1.313, p = 0.124), and pecking (mean ∆ 3.80; t(48) = 
-3.816, p = 0.001). While neutral exposures were on average lower than incongruent 
trials, they were not significantly so in any of the three measures: attendance (mean 
∆ 15.88s; t(48) = 0.990, p = 0.171) and search (mean ∆ 14.50s; t(48) = 1.154, p = 
0.315), and pecking (mean ∆ 0.13; t(48) = 0.075, p = 0.204).
 Prey destination. Taken together, the prey destination – whether it was eaten, 
taken away for caching or provisioning, or both occurred (once with each worm) – 
played a significant role in the response duration (see Figure 13), and much longer 
response durations when the worm was eaten immediately. There were no trials in 
which prey was left in the VoE box. 
Figure 13. Overall response by prey destination – Average response in search and 
attendance time and number of pecks.
 A One-Way ANOVA was used to compare means  between conditions: prey being 
eaten (N=50), taken away (N=59), and instances where both occurred (N=7). Trials 
where there was no prey found were not included. On average, all three response 
dimensions were all higher when prey was consumed (Attend = 72.60s, Search = 
56.66s, Pecks = 6.18), than when prey was taken away (Attend = 26.59s, Search = 
21.37s, Pecks = 1.61) or both consumption and removal occurred (Attend = 41.86s, 
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Search = 23.29s, Pecks = 0.00).  When examining prey destination across all 
congruent and incongruent trials in both experiments, differences in all three 
dimensions appeared significant: attendance duration (F (2, 113) = 17.198, p = .000), 
search duration (F (2, 113) = 20.589, p = .000), pecking frequency (F (2, 113) = 
9.795, p = .000).
Discussion
 The results of Experiment 1, which displayed trials  of ‘possible’ or ‘impossible’ or 
mathematical outcomes, show that robins spent significantly more time searching 
during incongruent than congruent trials. Robins also spent on average, more time 
searching after exposure to an incongruent trial than a neutral exposure (of simply 
the apparatus itself, and no trial or prey), but conversely spent on average less  time 
searching after congruent trials than a neutral exposure. The same pattern of results 
held true for Experiment 2, where trials  were manipulated so that outcomes were 
categorically ‘possible’ or ‘impossible’ rather than mathematically true or false. 
Looking at the data from both experiments, robins also spent more time searching 
when consuming the worm than when provisioning or caching the worm.
 Rugani et al.(2009) suggests that signature limits might differ depending on 
whether a species is altricial or precocial, or that perhaps task specificity plays a role. 
The domestic chicks (Gallus gallus) in his  study, for example, could perhaps have 
signature limits influenced by their brood size (on average 8-10 chicks). Following 
such logic, if task-specificity related to New Zealand robin ecology plays  a role in 
defining signature limits  for number discrimination (see Chapter 2) or addition and 
subtraction in the present study, robins’ signature limit could be closely related to the 
average ‘running inventory’ of insects stored in caches at a given time for each 
individual. Such a limit would not however, be broached in the present data, with 
prey items totalling no higher than 3 in any condition, but could potentially be an 
avenue of exploration in future studies.
 The inherent curiosity of New Zealand robins  (see Chapter 1) not only 
necessitated control exposures to the apparatus without any trial or prey present, but 
also saw a great deal of variation amongst individuals. Given the opportunity to 
continue returning and searching, in many cases an individual robin might return to 
the apparatus multiple times over the course of several hours to resume 
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investigating in some, but not all, cases. While an extended investigation of 
individual variation in continued searching would provide interesting data for a study 
focused on hunting and pilfering strategy, this type of lengthier, in-depth investigation 
into attention and memory related to placement of prey items was not applicable to 
the present study. 
 Whether an accumulator model (Meck & Church, 1983) or other cues such as 
individual characteristics lend themselves to the ability to add and subtract small 
numbers of items remains an unanswered question. Attention to individual physical 
characteristics  of same-species or even differing species  of prey is  an area that has 
not yet been experimentally approached with New Zealand robins. Infants, for 
example, rely on number rather than spatial information, when the objects in an array 
differ individual by feature (shape, colour), whereas the opposite is true for 
homogenous groups of items (Feigenson & Carey, 2003). Positive results  indicate 
the possibility that robins, like other species, have access  to basic arithmetical 
information in the absence of language. This finding provides further possible 
evidence supporting the theory that a basic system of calculation has evolved as part 
of a suite of features characterising a system representing number. 
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CHAPTER 5: Study 4 – Response to Human Gaze
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 Attentional cues and gaze direction are important components of communication 
and the perception of disposition in humans (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 
1997) and other social animals (Emery, 2000; Teufel et al., 2009).  A variety of 
species including some primates (Bräuer, Call, & Tomasello, 2005; Hare, Call, 
Agnetta, & Tomasello, 2000; Santos & Hauser, 1999), canids (Bräuer, Call, & 
Tomasello, 2004; Smith & Litchfield, 2010), horses (Proops & McComb, 2010) and 
birds (Peron, Chardard, Nagle, & Bovet, 2011; Vallortigara & Regolin, 2006; Von 
Bayern & Emery, 2009), follow human attentional cues such as gaze, although the 
context of response varies widely (competition, cooperation, occluders, subtlety of 
cues), as does success. Few studies have looked at spontaneous responses of free-
ranging, wild, or wild-caught animals  (Bateman & Fleming, 2011; Carter et al., 2008; 
Flombaum & Santos, 2005; Hampton, 1994). Of the latter, all have investigated gaze 
from a human-predator aversion context; none have dealt with wild subjects  naïve to 
human or mammalian behaviour. 
 This  endemic New Zealand songbird species, which has evolved in absence of 
terrestrial mammals until recently, is  examined here in order to explore possible 
evolutionary, ecological and behavioural influences on tracking of gaze direction. 
North Island Robins (Petroica longipes) face a highly competitive foraging paradigm 
(Powlesland, 1981), practicing food hoarding (Menzies & Burns, 2010) and pilfering 
(Van Horik & Burns, 2007). Robins may also be sensitive to the presence of 
conspecifics when caching, frequently re-caching prey (Burns & Van Horik, 2007), 
like other food-caching corvids  which display cache protection strategies  in the 
presence of observing competitors (Bugnyar & Heinrich, 2005; Dally, Emery, & 
Clayton, 2005). The unique combination of evolutionary isolation, food-hoarding and 
pilfering behaviour makes this species a highly interesting candidate as a model for 
investigating questions surrounding basic social intelligence.
 This  study asks whether wild North Island robins, a species  unique to New 
Zealand, are able to respond to what humans can and cannot see. To do so, six 
different conditions were presented to 24 adult robins in which they were given the 
opportunity to ‘steal’ a mealworm from one of two human competitors. North Island 
robins are unique in the study of gaze response in that humans and other terrestrial 
mammals are not natural predators, prey, or direct competitors of this species. 
Robins are fearless of humans (Menzies  & Burns, 2010), but familiar with predatory 
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birds such as falcons. If robins’ response to competitive foraging or pilfering 
opportunities is similar to those of rhesus monkeys (Flombaum & Santos, 2005), 
subjects should opportunistically steal from the human experimenter whose gaze is 
directed away or whose view is occluded from the desired mealworm. In addition to 
successfully following gaze to make contextually appropriate decision, robins must 
also be able to spontaneously utilise information about the direction of gaze and 
visual access in multiple mammalian competitors to make a task-relevant decision.
 Robins responded to a competitive food-pilfering task by utilising information 
about eye visibility of others. Robins  were sensitive to human attentional cues  but 
less responsive to eye and profile head direction. The results suggest that in the 
absence of evolutionary familiarity, robins are still able to understand and respond to 
humans’ social attentional cues, but may do so on the basis of avian eye physiology 
and visual acuity.
Methods
 Study area and subjects. A total of 24 adult robins participated in this study. 
Each individual robin was identified by a unique combination of coloured bands 
around their legs. Some subjects were known to have successfully participated in 
prior cognitive experiments (Hunt et al., 2008) and have regular exposure to visitors 
and staff walking through the sanctuary forest paths transecting the territories. 
Robins are not provided with food outside experimentation, and hunt freely for 
insects in the leaf litter within their self-established defended territories. North Island 
Robins (Petroica longipes) face a highly competitive foraging paradigm (Powlesland, 
1981) and practice food hoarding (Menzies & Burns, 2010) and a high rate of 
pilfering (Van Horik & Burns, 2007) – as a result, subjects were highly motivated to 
pilfer prey presented by human experimenters. Each robin was exposed to all 6 
conditions, using Latin Squares to alternate the order of exposure, experimenter side 
(left and right), and experimenter position (visual access or none) across the 24 
robins.  
 Robins, like other endemic birds of New Zealand, have evolved in the absence of 
terrestrial mammals and are particularly susceptible to predation due to naïve 
behaviour seen many isolated island populations (Menzies  & Burns, 2010). This 
naïve response to terrestrial mammals, in combination with food-hoarding and 
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pilfering behaviour, makes an ideal wild candidate for comparative cognition 
research eliciting spontaneous  responses. Taking this  unique ecological context into 
account, human experimenters in this  study stayed within very close range of ‘their’ 
mealworm prey and platform, as robins were unlikely to stay at a great distance 
while the demonstration portion of the trial was run.
 Apparatus and Procedure. Two experimenters performed each experiment, 
both acting as the competitors (Experimenter One and Two) presenting mealworms 
(Tenebrio molitar) on square wooden platforms (see Figure 14 below, and Appendix 
C for links  to example videos). Each platform was constructed with identical shallow 
circular indentations  and lined in plastic, to prevent immediate escape of mealworm 
prey. The female experimenters functioning as competitors were both of similar 
appearance and build, wore the same clothing (black rain pants, black hooded 
sweater, brown burlap shoe covers) intended both to function in the field 
environment and avoid colours  that may create unintended signalling (such as 
white). Experimenter one gave verbal instruction ahead of each trial, and movements 
were synchronised non-verbally during each trial. 
Figure 14. Two experimenters in position during a trial of Condition 5.
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 Subjects were located on known established territories, in which the experiment 
was conducted. Clapping and whistling was used to gain the subject’s attention at an 
appropriate location within the territory. Trials  were not run during the interaction of a 
subject with a mate or fledgling. For video recording, a camera was set up on a 
flexible field tripod, attached to trees or other landscape features as close as 
possible to a 90 degree side view of both the subject and experimenters, varying due 
to the slope of the valley forest landscape and vegetation density. 
 Each experimenter handled and placed her own platform and mealworm for each 
trial, to reinforce ownership of these items. Both experimenters approached the 
subject from the front, each holding a wooden platform and a single mealworm. At 
approximately 1-2m away from the subject, experimenters squatted and set their 
platform on the ground approximately 0.3m in front themselves. The robin observed 
from a position approximately equidistant between the two experimenters  and their 
platforms. Continuing to synchronise movements, experimenters then held their 
mealworms out at waist height (approx. 40cm) over the platform, for 10-20s  (visible, 
pinched between two fingers) until the robin was attending. Experimenters then 
dropped the mealworms simultaneously onto the platform and immediately assumed 
the final position described for each condition below.  The robin subject was then 
given the opportunity to approach one of the two competitors, retrieving one of the 
two mealworms. After retrieval, experimenters both resumed forward position and 
picked up their respective platforms. In order to avoid aversion or startling due to 
sound or movement while assuming positions at such close proximity, both 
experimenters made similar limb and body movements  for the same length of time, 
regardless of the final position. In all conditions, both the initial and final positions 
were in a squatting position, as  robins  approach the experimental arena from the 
ground (and average about 18cm in height), and this brings the head and face of the 
human experimenters more fully into view for the robins. 
 Conditions. Six different conditions were shown once to each of 24 adult birds; 
order of exposure was randomised using a Latin Square. 
 Condition 1. In this condition, subjects were presented with a choice between a 
human experimenter facing forward (toward mealworm and subject) and an 
experimenter facing 180° away (see Figure 15a). The eyes, head and body of the 
experimenter facing forward were all visible to the robin and positioned facing both 
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the mealworm and robin. Conversely, the eyes, head and body of the experimenter 
facing away were all obscured from view of the participating robin and positioned 
facing away from both the mealworm and robin. Platforms and experimenters were 
positioned approximately 1m apart, taking into account differences in terrain on each 
territory. 
 Condition 2. In Condition 2 (see Figure 15b), subjects  were presented with a 
choice in which the two human experimenters were both positioned between the 
platforms, and facing the same direction (towards one of the two mealworms). 
Human experimenters positioned themselves between the two platforms (placed 
approx. 1.5m apart), in relation to the participating robin. Both experimenters initially 
faced their platform, 180° away from each other (back to back), and simultaneously 
dropping the mealworms at the same time onto each platform. One experimenter 
then turned 180° to her final position, facing (eyes, head and body) entirely away 
from the platform she just dropped a mealworm worm onto and towards the back of 
the second experimenter (and beyond that the second experimenter’s mealworm). In 
the final position, the robin had a clear view of both experimenter’s  profiles, facing 
fully toward one of the two mealworms. The experimenter facing 180° away from her 
mealworm and platform had a view obscured by experimenter two, and although her 
eyes, head and body are all positioned facing the second experimenter’s mealworm, 
she could not clearly view either mealworm. 
 Condition 3. Subjects chose between an experimenter whose eyes and head 
were facing forward (toward mealworm prey) an experimenter whose eyes and head 
were facing 90° to the side (see Figure 15c). Both experimenters’ bodies were 
stationary and facing forward as in Condition 1. After placing their platforms on the 
ground, experimenters  simultaneously dropped the worms from the same height, 
and one experimenter turned her head and eyes 90° away from the platform, always 
in the opposite direction of the second experimenter. 
 Condition 4. In this condition (see Figure 15d), subjects  were presented with a 
choice between a human experimenter whose eyes were facing forward (toward 
mealworm prey) and a second experimenter whose eyes were directed 45° outward 
(away from other experimenter). Both the face and body of each experimenter were 
stationary and facing a forward position. Placement of the platforms and dropping 
mealworms proceeded as described in the Apparatus  and Procedure section, 
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simultaneously, with one experimenter’s  eyes turning 45° away into final position. 
After experimenter’s  eyes were in position the subject was given 1 minute to 
approach and retrieve one of the two mealworms.
Figure 15. The six conditions presented to robins. In each, one experimenter has full 
view of the mealworm in front of her, and the view of the other is obscured.
 Condition 5. This condition presented subjects  with a choice between a human 
experimenter who was covering their face with a cloth and a second experimenter 
who covered their chest with a cloth (see Figure 15e). Each opaque, dark green 
canvas cloth measured 21cm wide by 23cm in height. After placing platforms in 
position, both experimenters took the cloths  they were holding and simultaneously 
brought their cloth into position, with one experimenter bringing it in front of her face 
(completely obscuring the face), and the second holding it in front of her chest, so 
that in squatting position it appears held below the chin and above her knees. 
 Condition 6. Subjects were presented with a choice between a human 
experimenter who was covering their eyes with a cloth and a second experimenter 
who covered their mouth with a cloth (see Figure 15f). Each opaque, dark green 
canvas cloth measured 21cm wide by 7cm in height. After placing platforms in 
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position, both experimenters took the cloths  they were holding and simultaneously 
brought their cloth into position, with one experimenter bringing it in front of her eyes 
(completely obscuring the eyes), and the second holding it in front of her mouth.
Results
 Body orientation. Conditions 1 and 2 presented two human experimenters with 
different body orientation. In Condition 1, one experimenter faced her entire body 
(including face and head) toward ‘her’ platform with ‘her’ mealworm, and another 
experimenter faced her entire body away from her own platform and mealworm. 
Robins selectively approached and retrieved the prey from the experimenter facing 
away from her mealworm (binomial probability: p < 0.005; see Figure 16a), 
suggesting robins  approach and pilfer prey based partly on what an individual has 
visual access to, regardless of species. In Condition 2, experimenters  placed their 
platforms at the side with respect to the observing subject. The robin had to choose 
between an experimenter facing 90° to the side and looking at the platform with her 
mealworm, or an experimenter facing 90° to the same side, but with her back to her 
platform and mealworm. Subjects reliably chose the mealworm behind, but not within 
view of, the experimenter (p < 0.005; see Figure 16b), suggesting that while both 
experimenters only had a profile view of the subject, approach in either condition 
was not based on generally avoiding the vicinity of the experimenter facing forward.
 Head and eye orientation. The next two conditions investigated whether robins 
were also sensitive to where a human is looking. In the Condition 3, interestingly, 
robins did not preferentially select between either the experimenter whose head was 
oriented 90° to the side or whose head was facing forward (p = 0.117; see Figure 
16c). Robins did, however, reliably select the experimenter whose eyes were 
oriented 45° to the side (p < 0.05; see Figure 16d) rather than the experimenter 
whose eyes were oriented directly at the mealworm in front of her. These findings 
suggest that while robins are sensitive to the direction that a human is looking to 
some extent, their decision-making about what a human experimenter can and 
cannot see takes different information into account than a primate (Flombaum & 
Santos, 2005). This result differs markedly from both other mammalian and avian 
evidence of sensitivity to information about what can and cannot be seen, but 
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suggests that avian reasoning may take different physiological information into 
account (Cook, 2000; Güntürkün, 1999).
Figure 16. Results for all six conditions, displaying number of subjects  pilfering from 
each experimenter, with one trial per condition per subject.
 
 Visual occlusion. The final two conditions investigated whether robins were able 
to take into account a physical barrier blocking an experimenter’s  visual access to 
her mealworm prey. In Condition 5, robins preferentially pilfered the mealworm of the 
experimenter with an opaque cloth barrier held in front of her face (p ≥ 0.001; see 
Figure 16e) rather than the experimenter with a cloth barrier held in front of her chest 
(see Figure 14). Robins also overwhelmingly selected the mealworm of an 
experimenter with an opaque cloth barrier held in front of her eyes (p > 0.0001; see 
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Figure 16f) as opposed to an experimenter with an opaque cloth barrier in front of 
her mouth. Results from both conditions indicate robins are able to take into account 
whether a visual occluder is obstructing another agent from clearly viewing prey, 
when making decisions about pilfering or competitive foraging. 
Discussion
 North Island robins (Petroica longipes) responded aversively to the presence of 
human eyes  in a choice task to 'steal' mealworm prey in five of six conditions 
presented. Robins did not distinguish between human experimenters facing towards 
or 90° away from prey, and were equally likely to steal the mealworm of either 
experimenter when these two positions were presented. Robins’ preference in 
selectively choosing to steal from the human experimenter without visual access in 
every other case appears to indicate sensitivity to the gaze in a species  other than 
itself. Given the relatively aggressive, competitive, and only moderately social nature 
of this species (very small social networks  with comparison to more highly social 
birds) (Menzies & Burns, 2008), responding with any sensitivity to eye gaze in an 
invasive mammalian species is an interesting behaviour to consider, and begs a 
number of questions about both influencing factors and context. While the present 
study shows a very basic level of response to the presence of eyes facing desired 
prey, it leads to the more intriguing question about whether this naive species would 
successfully and flexibly reason about visual access in a species  with the vast 
differences in visual systems seen in humans with comparison to passerines. 
 An interesting difference between North Island robins and other species showing 
these abilities (Flombaum & Santos, 2005; Kaminski, Riedel, Call, & Tomasello, 
2005; Smith & Litchfield, 2010), is that robins fail to differentiate human 
experimenters with heads facing 90° away from those looking forward, even while 
succeeding in other conditions, including when only the angle of gaze direction itself, 
albeit with slightly less success than other conditions. 
 One potential consideration is whether robins might be making decisions in this 
context within the framework of an avian visual system, regardless of species of their 
competitor. Passerine visual systems are functionally very different from human 
vision in that there is a much wider range of vision peripherally, and in contrast to 
having acute binocular frontal vision and poorer peripheral vision like humans, they 
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have acute monocular vision laterally, and much less acute frontal binocular vision 
(Güntürkün, 1999). Therefore, in the instance where robins were asked to choose 
between a human facing frontally and facing 90° laterally to the object, both at short 
distances, the subject may possibly fail to preferentially select in this condition based 
on an underlying response limited to avian vision systems, in which case both 
experimenters could be attending the contested mealworm. The current array of 
modern predators has only been exposed to indigenous species for roughly the last 
800 years (Whitwell, 2011). (This is not to imply they are naturally predator-free; New 
Zealand falcons, Falco novaeseelandiae, are a natural predator of robins and other 
passerines that predate other introduced predators, for example.) In lieu of 
evolutionary influences or signalling via dichromatic eye morphology, one possibility 
is  that robins are responding to human gaze-direction as though it functions  like that 
of songbirds. Such behaviour may provide support of the ‘like me’ hypothesis 
underlying basic social cognition described by Meltzoff (Meltzoff, 2007). Whether 
lack of co-evolution has played a role in limiting robins’ ability to respond to differing 
visual perimeters in introduced species remains, however, an open question that 
requires further experimentation to investigate as  any possible contributing factor to 
this behaviour. 
  To date, however, such experiments have been performed on hand-reared 
captive birds  (Bugnyar, 2011; Peron et al., 2011; Range, Horn, Bugnyar, Gajdon, & 
Huber, 2009; Von Bayern & Emery, 2009; Clayton, Dally & Emery 2007) or on non-
naïve wild or wild-caught birds, and are exposed exclusively to a predator response 
situation, where the human acted in a predatory gaze context (Bateman & Fleming, 
2011; Carter et al., 2008; Hampton, 1994), unlike the present study. Jackdaws did 
appear to respond with increased latency in approach to either one or two human 
eyes visibly oriented toward food (Von Bayern & Emery, 2009), differentiating it from 
other avian studies (Carter et al., 2008; Jones, 1980) where a more basic 
mechanism appears to be operating more in line with the robins’ gaze-aversion to 
the appearance of two eyes. Von Bayern and Emery suggest that for jackdaws, this 
could be related to sensing and responding to predation, and point out that jackdaw 
eye morphology (light iris  and dark pupil) makes eye orientation discernible much as 
humans’ do (Von Bayern & Emery, 2009). Neither of these explanations, however, 
apply easily in the case of New Zealand robins, as they are unlikely to respond to 
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humans as predators, and have eye morphology without any contrast in colour 
(uniformly dark). 
 Little is  known about whether or how eyes or eye direction plays a significant role 
in communication between robins, although both inter- and intraspecific signalling 
occurs via flashing a white frontal spot above the beak (Flack, 1976). A high rate of 
cache pilferage between mates (Burns, 2009; Burns & Van Horik, 2007; Van Horik & 
Burns, 2007) certainly presents  the distinct possibility of caching strategy involving 
an awareness and response to their conspecifics‘ eye gaze and direction, like it does 
with other species  dependent on caching behaviour for food sources (Bugnyar & 
Heinrich, 2005; Bugnyar, 2011; Dally, Clayton, & Emery, 2006; Dally et al., 2005; 
Emery et al., 2004). Such pressures do not however, necessarily predicate an 
advanced knowledge state about others, and such strategies remain to be 
investigated in more detail in this particular species.
 Another important consideration is exposure to humans. The population in this 
experiment inhabits a northeastern section of Zealandia (see Figure 2 in Chapter 1, 
and Appendix B), a wildlife sanctuary open to public visitors. This particular section 
of forest has a fairly dense network of walking trails that are very accessible and 
close to the entrance of the park, and therefore see substantially heavier human 
traffic than the southern reaches of the sanctuary for example. Whether populations 
of robins  in areas less exposed to humans – less transited reaches of the sanctuary 
an isolated offshore island – would also respond to human eyes or gaze direction in 
the same manner is  an important question. It is  entirely possible that the responses 
of this  group of robins could be wholly or partially explained due to regular exposure 
to both visitor’s presence and interactions  with experimenters, and that a whole new 
suite of responses might arise from populations  with differing levels  of exposure. The 
loss of an anti-predatory response to mammalian predators within a generation 
speaks to the plasticity of their behaviour at least as much as it does their 
evolutionary history and naiveté.  While anti-predatory behaviour was developed in 
some (much reduced) mainland populations after the arrival of western immigrants, it 
appears to be lost within a generation of being translocated to areas heavily 
protected from invasive threats (Whitwell et al., 2011). An aversion to the presence of 
eyes (Jones, 1980), cross-species, simulated, or conspecific, is  a naturally occurring 
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and almost ubiquitous response in predated species. It is unique that in this case, it 
also appears to be present in a species not predated by mammals.  
 The robins’ response in the conditions manipulating only eyes or using visual 
occluders suggest that they are not simply using a behavioural rule to avoid the 
human experimenter facing forward, as in this case robins would not have selectively 
chosen between the two experimenters with different occluders. Robins  do face 
aggressive intraspecific competition and pilfering from conspecifics (Menzies & 
Burns, 2010). However, it appears unlikely that robins were responding based solely 
on whether the overall demeanour is threatening for two reasons. 
 First and foremost, due to their lack of fear of humans or other terrestrial 
mammals (particularly in this protected population), robins are unlikely to respond to 
a threatening demeanour even in those mammals that are natural predators of birds 
such as cats, rats and stoats (Blackwell, 2005; Whitwell et al., 2011). This is further 
evinced by the experimental procedure itself; after each trial, it was necessary for the 
experimenters to immediately remove the platforms and remaining worm, or robins 
would have easily stolen both worms with very little hesitation in almost every case. 
Preference for pilfering the worm from the experimenter with an obscured visual field 
did not at all preclude a propensity for pilfering from both experimenters given the 
opportunity; it simply revealed a strategic priority.  
 Secondly, robins will often follow walking humans to hunt for insects  in the leaf 
litter that overturns underfoot, and observe and interact with humans at very close 
range (Menzies & Burns, 2010). Ecologists  have actually gone so far as to speculate 
that humans play a role similar to that of a Moa from a robin ecology perspective 
(Atkinson & Millener, 1991). Such behavioural, ecological and historical contextual 
details  underscore the likelihood that robins are not exclusively responding to 
predatory threat or posture in humans, as might be the case in other species  where 
such a task is  presented. Again, this puts New Zealand robins and other indigenous 
fauna in a unique position for continuation of such research from a non-predator 
response perspective that might serve as an informative contrast to other avian gaze 
studies presently undertaken. 
  Jackdaws (Von Bayern & Emery, 2009) and rhesus monkeys (Flombaum & 
Santos, 2005) both respond to the presence of human eyes in most conditions, and 
it appears that robins are also sensitive to human eyes in many conditions. It is 
68
difficult to directly compare with other studies  examining birds’ responses to human 
gaze, because such studies focus on species that have co-evolved with mammals, 
or experienced hand-rearing and sometimes training (Bugnyar, 2011; Peron et al., 
2011; Townsend et al., 2009; Von Bayern & Emery, 2009). To date, none of these 
studies have examined a non-naïve species  in the wild using a similar competitive 
object-choice paradigm. Future research is necessary to examine what role co-
evolution, intra and interspecific social cues, visual field and visual access, exposure 
to predatory and non-predatory invasive species, age, sex, pilfering strategy, and 
other ecological contexts might play in shaping a cross-species sensitivity to eyes or 
gaze, or anything approaching a knowledge of attentional and mental states.
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CHAPTER 6: Study 5 – Response to Human Physical Capability
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 The ability to reason about agency and action (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007) has been 
explored in a myriad of ways  and species. Species  from newly hatched chicks to 
chimpanzees are observed as  sensitive to what their predators or competitors can 
and cannot see (Agrillo et al., 2004; Flombaum & Santos, 2005; Hare et al., 2001), 
goal-directed action (Behne, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005; Call, Hare, 
Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2004; Peron, Rat-Fischer, Nagle, & Bovet, 2010; Phillips, 
Barnes, Mahajan, Yamaguchi, & Santos, 2009) and gaze direction (Bateman & 
Fleming, 2011; Bräuer et al., 2005; Bugnyar, Stöwe, & Heinrich, 2004; Carter et al., 
2008; Jaime, Lopez, & Lickliter, 2009) and even physical causality (Call, Hare, 
Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2004; Horner & Whiten, 2005). 
 The role of the limbs in the execution of specific actions is  linked to physical 
causality and has been studied in chimpanzees  (Vonk & Subiaul, 2009), but not yet 
in avians. For both primates and avians, this may be an important capacity for 
reasoning about the actions of conspecifics and actions; affecting success in 
competing for mates, foraging, defence of food stores and possibly assessing 
strength and weakness in competitors, predator and prey alike. For North Island 
robins in particular, it begs the question of whether there exists a basic 
understanding of physical causality as  it relates  to limb mobility in humans; a species 
not only much more taxonomically distant than humans and other primates, but one 
with which exposure on an evolutionary scale is only extremely recent. To this  end, 
this  experiment was adapted to test wild robins’ abilities to track salient observable 
cues – visibility of arms and legs – to potentially predict basic ‘capability’ (the ability 
to perform specific tasks) in humans. 
 The majority of studies looking at perception of capability in a human 
experimenter by another species examine the problem in terms of mental state, 
looking at intentionality or goal directedness of human experimenters. While 
chimpanzees  did not preferentially distinguish human experimenters who 
accidentally or deliberately failed to offer food (Povinelli, Perilloux, Reaux, & 
Bierschwale, 1998), both chimpanzees and human infants discriminated between 
‘unwilling’ and ‘unable’ experimenters  (Behne et al., 2005; Call et al., 2004), as  did 
capuchin monkeys  (Phillips et al., 2009). A recent study suggests that humans and 
chimpanzees attend differently to goal-directed actions (Myowa-Yamakoshi, Scola, & 
Hirata, 2012). Outside of primates, jackdaws (Von Bayern & Emery, 2009), dogs 
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(Hare & Tomasello, 1999; Miklósi, Polgárdi, Topál, & Csányi, 1998), dingos (Smith & 
Litchfield, 2010), dolphins (Pack & Herman, 2004), goats (Kaminski et al., 2005) and 
horses (Maros, Gácsi, & Miklósi, 2008) all appear to respond in different contexts 
with varying levels of success to human social cues and gestures such as pointing. 
A recent study with African grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus)(Peron et al., 2011) 
found that parrots displayed more requesting behaviour when an experimenter was 
unwilling to give them seeds – and that their behaviour pattern changed according to 
attention. However, African grey parrots were unable to use pointing gestures or 
gaze consistently as cues (Giret, Miklósi, & Kreutzer, 2009). Jackdaws, in contrast, 
are able to use pointing as a cue, but only by a familiar caretaker (Von Bayern & 
Emery, 2009). Despite such evidence, little has been done to investigate the more 
obvious and preliminary question of whether other species  respond simply to salient 
observable cues – such as visibility of limbs – to predict a human experimenter’s 
physical capability, regardless of motivational state. As Vonk and Subiaul (2009) 
point out, such a task does not require the subject to reason about unobservable 
mental states, or make the inferences necessary to understand a complex gesture 
such as pointing or subtle mental state differences like ‘unwilling’. The present study 
focuses on presenting experimenters who appear physically rather than 
motivationally incapable.  
  In this study, we asked whether wild North Island robins, a species unique to 
New Zealand, were able to reason about physical capability in humans. To do so, ten 
different conditions were presented to 25 adult robins in two experiments, in which 
they were given the opportunity to ‘steal’ a mealworm from one of two human 
competitors. If robins’ behaviour in competitive foraging or pilfering opportunities 
takes human capability into account, subjects should opportunistically steal from the 
human experimenter whose body or limbs are more occluded. In addition to 
successfully responding to body and limb visibility to make contextually appropriate 
decision, robins must also be able to spontaneously utilise information about 
distance, movement and physical access in multiple mammalian competitors to 
make a task-relevant decision.
 The methodology adopted for this study is very similar to that in Vonk’s (2009) 
chimpanzee study on capability, but was  adapted to both for the use of wild birds as 
subjects, and conducting trials  out in the field.  In addition to either displaying or 
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obscuring arms and legs, the appearance of nose/mouth area of the face is also 
altered. Use of the beak is frequent in territorial defence, pilfering, and the majority of 
other interaction with and manipulation of the environment around them; for a bird it 
is  as much as a “limb” as  other appendages; jackdaws for example, use beak 
pointing to direct each other’s  attention to objects (Von Bayern & Emery, 2009). Most 
importantly, this choice task is framed within a competitive paradigm. Instead of 
being asked to choose a food item from a human who will cooperate by providing 
that item at request when physically possible, robins are asked to choose between 
stealing the food item from an experimenter, given differing observable physical 
cues. An additional significant feature is the static location of the mealworm bait in 
reference to the experimenters. The present study does not attempt to address 
robins’ ability to flexibly apply an awareness of causality or capability, in that the 
position of the mealworm was not altered in order to appear within reach of only one 
limb region or another between conditions. It does, however, ask whether a basic 
understanding of human limb capability in cache defence is present in a species  that 
has not co-evolved with humans.
 This  study intends to examine whether robins respond to a competitive food-
pilfering task by utilising information of selective visibility of others. If robins respond 
with sensitivity to limb visibility, it might suggest a basic, rudimentary perception of 
human capability and causality. 
Methods
 Study area and subjects. Wild North Island robins (Petroica longipes) were the 
focus of this study. A total of 25 adult robins  participated in this study. Each individual 
robin was identified by a unique combination of coloured bands around their legs. 
Some subjects  were known to have successfully participated in prior cognitive 
experiments (see Appendix A) and have regular exposure to visitors and staff 
walking through the sanctuary forest paths transecting the territories. Robins are not 
provided with food outside experimentation, and hunt freely for insects in the leaf 
litter within their self-established defended territories. North Island Robins (Petroica 
longipes) face a highly competitive foraging paradigm (Powlesland, 1981) and 
practice food hoarding (Menzies & Burns, 2010) and a high rate of pilfering (Van 
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Horik & Burns, 2007) – as a result, subjects were highly motivated to pilfer prey 
presented by human experimenters.  
 Procedure. Two experimenters  performed each experiment, both acting as  the 
competitors (Experimenter One and Two) presenting mealworms (Tenebrio molitar) 
on square wooden platforms (see Appendix C for links  to example videos). Each 
platform was constructed with identical shallow circular indentations and lined in 
plastic, to prevent immediate escape of mealworm prey. The female experimenters 
were both of similar appearance and build, wore the same clothing (black rain pants, 
long-sleeved green shirt, black shoe covers) intended both to function in the field 
environment and avoid colours  that may create unintended signalling (such as 
white). One experimenter gave verbal instruction ahead of each trial, and 
movements were synchronised during each trial. 
 Subjects were located on known established territories, in which each set of trials 
was conducted. Clapping and whistling was used to gain the subject’s attention at an 
appropriate location within the territory. For video recording, a camera was set up on 
a flexible field tripod, attached to trees or other landscape features as close as 
possible to a 90 degree side view of both the subject and experimenters, varying due 
to the slope of the valley forest landscape and vegetation density. 
 Both experimenters approached the subject from the front, each holding a 
wooden platform and a single mealworm. Each platform was within easy reach of 
only the experimenter directly behind it. At approximately 1-2m away from the 
subject, experimenters squatted and set their platform on the ground approximately 
0.3m in front themselves. The robin observed from a position approximately 
equidistant between the two experimenters and their platforms. Continuing to 
synchronise movements, experimenters then held their mealworms out at waist 
height (approx. 40cm) over the platform, for 10-20s (visible, pinched between two 
fingers) until the robin was attending. Experimenters then dropped the mealworms 
simultaneously onto the platform and immediately assumed the final position 
described for each condition below.  The robin subject was then given the 
opportunity to approach one of the two competitors, retrieving one of the two 
mealworms. After retrieval, experimenters  both resumed forward position and picked 
up their respective platforms.
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 In order to avoid aversion or startling due to sound or movement while assuming 
positions at such close proximity, both experimenters made similar limb and body 
movements for the same length of time, regardless of the final position.  
 Experiment 1. Twenty-four adult robins were exposed to each of 6 conditions, 
using Latin Squares to alternate the order of exposure, experimenter side (left and 
right), and experimenter position (visual access or none) across the 24 robins. 
Opaque brown cloth was used measuring 210cm by 154cm to obscure the entire 
body or limbs of either experimenter. The same type of cloth was used for obscuring 
part of the face, measuring 26cm by 75cm.
 Condition 1. (See Figure 17a) Neither experimenter was covered in this 
condition. Subjects  were presented with a choice between Experimenter One in 
squatting position, and Experimenter Two in standing position. Arms, legs  and faces 
were all fully visible in this condition.  
 Condition 2. (See Figure 17b) Both experimenters were covered in this 
condition, revealing only their head from just above the bridge of the nose. 
Experimenter One squatted, covered in opaque brown cloth, while Experimenter Two 
stood, covered in identical opaque brown cloth. 
 Condition 3. (See Figure 17c) Experimenter One was covered in opaque brown 
cloth, with her entire body visually occluded from the bridge of the nose to the 
ground. Experimenter Two was not covered, but draped an identical brown cloth over 
her lap, without occluding any limbs or a significant portion of her body. Both 
experimenters squatted in the final position.
 Condition 4. (See Figure 17d) Experimenter One covered her legs with an 
opaque brown cloth, visually occluding her legs  from the waist down. Experimenter 
Two covered her arms with an identical brown cloth, occluding her arms, torso and 
shoulders. Both experimenters squatted in the final position.
 Condition 5. (See Figure 17e) Experimenter One covered her arms with an 
opaque brown cloth, visually occluding her arms, torso and shoulders. Experimenter 
Two covered her mouth and nose with a smaller brown cloth, draping an identical 
brown cloth over her lap, without occluding limbs or any significant portion of her 
body. Both experimenters squatted in the final position.
 Condition 6. (See Figure 17f) Experimenter One covered her legs with an 
opaque brown cloth, visually occluding her legs  from the waist down. Experimenter 
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Two covered her mouth and nose with a smaller brown cloth, draping an identical 
brown cloth over her lap, without occluding limbs or any significant portion of her 
body. Both experimenters squatted in the final position.
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 17. The six conditions presented to robins in Experiment 1, using opaque 
brown cloth to obscure the body or limbs of the experimenters.
 Experiment 2. Twenty-four adult robins  were exposed each of 4 conditions, 
using Latin Squares to alternate the order of exposure, experimenter side (left and 
right), and experimenter position (visual access or none) across the 24 robins. 
 Condition 1. (See Figure 18a) Experimenter One squatted behind a wooden 
plank, her body entirely visually occluded, with her face visible only from just below 
her eyes (above the bridge of the nose) to the top of her head. Experimenter Two 
was entirely visible, squatting next to the plank without occluding significant portions 
of any of her limbs, torso or face.
 Condition 2. (See Figure 18b) Experimenter One squatted behind a wooden 
plank, her body entirely visually occluded, with her face visible only from just below 
her eyes (above the bridge of the nose) to the top of her head. Experimenter Two 
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squatted behind a wooden plank, her body entirely visually occluded, with her face, 
including eyes and mouth, entirely visible along the outside edge of the plank. 
 Condition 3. (See Figure 18c) Experimenter One squatted behind a wooden 
plank, her body entirely visually occluded, with her face visible only from just below 
her eyes (above the bridge of the nose) to the top of her head. Experimenter Two 
squatted behind a wooden plank, with her body occluded and arms visible along the 
outside edges of the plank, and her face visible only from just below the eyes to the 
top of her head.
 Condition 4. (See Figure 18d) Experimenter One squatted behind a wooden 
plank, her body entirely visually occluded, with her face visible only from just below 
her eyes (above the bridge of the nose) to the top of her head. Experimenter Two 
squatted behind a wooden plank, with her body occluded and legs visible below the 
long edge of the plank, and her face visible only from just below the eyes to the top 
of her head.
Figure 18. The six conditions  presented to robins in Experiment 2, using a wooden 
plank to obscure the body or limbs of the experimenters.
(b)(a)
(c) (d)
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Results
 In Experiment 1, for Condition 1 (Figure 17a), there was very little change in 
latency (1.55s) of response between robins who chose to steal from the visible 
standing or visible squatting experimenter. The same was true for Condition 4 
(Figure 17d) arms covered vs. legs covered (1.77), Condition 5 (Figure 17e) arms 
covered vs. nose/mouth covered (0.34s), and Condition 6 (Figure 17f) legs covered 
vs. nose/mouth covered (2.10s). In comparison, there were larger differences in 
average latency for Condition 2 (Figure 17b) covered squatting vs. covered standing 
(9.81s), or Condition 3 (Figure 17c) visible squatting vs. covered squatting (8.68s). In 
Experiment 2, there were noticeable differences in latency to respond between 
pilfering choice (which experimenter was stolen from) in three of four conditions; 
Condition 1 (Figure 18a) visible vs. covered (3.81s), Condition 2 (Figure 18b) nose/
mouth visible vs. all covered (8.54s), and Condition 3 (Figure 18c) arms visible vs. all 
covered (4.95s). In the Condition (d) legs visible vs. all covered difference in average 
latency of response (1.17s) was small. 
 Experiment 1. For Experiment 1, Conditions 1, 2 and 3 presented two human 
experimenters with differing positions and visibility of the entire body. In Condition 1, 
Experimenter One was uncovered and standing, and Experimenter Two was 
uncovered and squatting. Robins reliably approached and retrieved the mealworm 
from the experimenter standing and uncovered (binomial probability: p < 0.01; see 
Figure 19a). In Condition 2, were similarly positioned, squatting and standing, but 
both entirely covered in opaque brown cloth, except the top of the head to just below 
the eyes. Limbs, nose and mouth of both experimenters were all occluded. Subjects 
selectively chose the mealworm in front of the experimenter who was standing and 
covered (p < 0.05; see Figure 19b). Results from both of these conditions  suggest 
that proximity to the face is a strong factor in decision-making regarding competitive 
foraging or pilfering and risk-taking (see Study 4).  In Condition 3, Experimenter One 
was covered and squatting and Experimenter Two was uncovered and squatting. 
Robins selectively approached and retrieved the mealworm from the experimenter 
covered and squatting (binomial probability: p < 0.05; see Figure 19c). Overall, the 
results of these three conditions  indicate that robins preferentially pilfer prey from 
human experimenters that are standing, and visually occluded. 
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Figure 19. Results for all six conditions in Experiment 1, displaying number of 
subjects pilfering from each experimenter, with one trial per condition per subject.
 
79
 Conditions 4, 5 and 6 presented experimenters in which either legs, arms or nose 
and mouth were visually occluded. Experimenters were in squatting position for all 
three conditions. In Condition 4, Experimenter One covered her legs with opaque 
brown cloth and Experimenter Two covered her arms. In Condition 5, Experimenter 
One covered her nose and mouth and Experimenter Two covered her arms. In 
Condition 6, Experimenter One covered her nose and mouth and Experimenter Two 
covered her legs.  Results for all three of these conditions found that robins did not 
selectively choose either experimenter (binomial probability: p = 0.149; see Figure 
19d-f). Taken together, these results indicate that robins do not selectively avoid only 
a single limb region (legs, arms, or nose and mouth).
 Experiment 2. Experiment 2 alters two fundamental features with comparison to 
Experiment 1: rather than covering a single ‘limb region’ (both arms, legs or “beak”) 
at a time, only one limb region at a time is  revealed for comparison, and wooden 
planks are used to occlude experimenters rather than cloth. In these Conditions, 
Experimenter 1 was always entirely occluded. Experimenter 2 was always fully or 
partially visible: in Condition 1 she was fully visible (Figure 18a), Condition 2 only her 
face (including mouth and nose) was visible (Figure 18b), in Condition 3 only her 
arms were visible (Figure 18c), and in Condition 4 only her legs were visible (Figure 
18d).  Experimenters were squatting in all conditions. Robins reliably chose the fully 
occluded experimenter in all four conditions (Figure 20), where Conditions 3 and 4 
had slightly stronger significance (p < 0.005; see Figure 20c-d) than Conditions 1 
and 2 (p < 0.05; see Figures 20a-b). 
 These findings suggest that robins are sensitive to the visibility of all three ‘limb’ 
regions (legs, arms, nose/mouth), taking this information into account when making 
decisions about pilfering or foraging activities. While these results are not directly 
comparable to primate performance (Vonk & Subiaul, 2009) where flexible 
alternation between bait location was also required for successful performance, they 
do suggest robins possess rudimentary sensitivity to limb visibility within the 
framework of cache defence and competition. 
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Figure 20. Results  for all four conditions in Experiment 2, displaying number of 
subjects pilfering from each experimenter, with one trial per condition per subject.
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Discussion
 North Island robins  demonstrated significantly different responses in pilfering 
from human experimenters when a limb region is  either visible or obscured, but do 
not appear to differentiate in preference for a specific region. In Experiment 1, 
subjects preferred to pilfer from an experimenter who was standing or entirely 
covered in an opaque cloth (Conditions 1, 2 & 3, see Figure 17a-c), but did not show 
a preference when only one ‘limb region’ (arms, legs or nose/mouth) was occluded 
(Conditions 4, 5 & 6, see Figure 17d-f). It is  possible that the weaker positive p-value 
for Condition 2 is at least partially due to an effect of avoidance, because of wind 
fluttering the cloth wrapping the standing experimenter; an unavoidable occurrence 
in some trials in a peninsular region prone to strong winds such as Wellington. In 
Experiment 2, subjects were consistently more likely to pilfer from an experimenter 
who was occluded, rather than an experimenter with a limb region showing.  
 A simple rule for avoiding the human agent with proportionally more limb area 
visible is  certainly one possible explanation for the robins’ response to some 
conditions. It does not, however, clearly or consistently apply proportionally in effect, 
where they should have had a less aversive response in a condition where only the 
nose/mouth area were exposed (see Figure 20b), presenting far less visible surface 
area, with comparison to a condition where the entire leg region was exposed (see 
Figure 20d), presenting far greater visible surface area. There was not a 
proportionally lower level of avoidance of cases with less body surface area visible 
than in cases with more, and appear to avoid “beak” and “leg” visible conditions 
equally. Using the same example, when both experimenters are squatting, robins’ 
responses also do not appear wholly explained by the proximity of the exposed limb 
region – even while the exposed leg region was at a closer approximate distance to 
the prey and the robin than the exposed nose/mouth area, percentage of responses 
did not indicate an influence of this difference in distance. 
 Conversely, in Experiment 1, where experimenters  were standing as well as 
squatting in two conditions, this  difference in distance to the head and upper torso in 
the standing experimenter with comparison to the squatting experimenter may well 
have a determining factor in the robins’ preference for pilfering from the standing 
experimenter, whose head and torso were at a greater distance from both the prey 
and the robin itself. It is important in all of these cases to consider context; even 
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adult robins with frequent exposure to humans traversing their territory are unafraid 
and seek out rather than avoid relatively close proximity to completely unoccluded 
human bodies. Systematic avoidance of only portions of them therefore, based 
solely on the proportion showing, would be a surprising behaviour in a species 
showing little hesitation to approach these same body regions within a meter outside 
of the context of any experiment obscuring limbs. Such behavioural and ecological 
contextual details underscore that while it may be a contributory factor, robins are 
unlikely to be responding to proportional visibility of humans alone.
 This  study also does not in any way conclusively indicate that robins perceive a 
human’s nose and mouth as  analogous to beaks, or consider this  body region 
capable of manipulating the environment in the same way. It does, however, 
establish that they respond by avoiding this facial region much the same way they do 
visible legs and arms, even in lieu of observing human behaviour in which the nose/
mouth was used in the manipulation of objects  or aggression. The birds that took 
part in these experiments are permanent residents of a fenced sanctuary open to the 
public, and walking paths transect their territories, inviting regular exposure to human 
visitors. It is  certainly possible that birds in areas of forest less exposed to human 
visitation, or populations isolated on offshore islands, might show differences in 
response to the visibility of limb areas. 
 As noted in Study 4 (Chapter 5), pertaining to visibility of human eyes, evidence 
shows that this  species has a great deal of plasticity in responding to mammalian 
predators, depending on exposure or lack thereof, and can lose anti-predatory 
behaviour within a generation of movement to protected areas (Whitwell et al., 2011). 
This  suggests the possibility that behavioural responses toward other non-predatory 
mammals, such as humans, could also be strongly mediated by exposure.  New 
fledglings, within 6 months  of hatching, are often more likely to approach and remain 
within an extremely close proximity of human arms, legs, and bags in this more 
heavily trafficked area of the forest than birds  1 year or older (observed in situ). 
Ecologically, birds  (and other species) frequently adapt their behaviour to the 
physical world around them, from road noise (Slabbekoorn & Ripmeester, 2007), to 
changes in biodiversity (Sol & Lefebvre, 2000). In this context, it is interesting that 
the data provided by this study appears  to demonstrate that a behavioural adaptation 
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of pilfering and foraging responses could be applicable to introduced species 
(mammals).
 Previous experimentation has shown that nonhuman animals, both mammals 
(Call, 2007; Kundey, De Los Reyes, Taglang, Baruch, & German, 2010; Pattison, 
Miller, Rayburn-Reeves, & Zentall, 2010; Santos, Sulkowski, Spaepen, & Hauser, 
2002) and birds (Bird & Emery, 2010; Pollok, Prior, & Güntürkün, 2000; Zucca, Milos, 
& Vallortigara, 2007) represent and reason about physical objects. Physical contact 
in particular is  a salient cue in physics problems, and is attended to not only by 
chimpanzees (Povinelli & Vonk, 2003) whereas bonobos and rooks had difficulty 
(Helme et al., 2006). A study with chicks (Gallus gallus) (Chiandetti & Vallortigara, 
2011) found that they showed intuitive reasoning about occluded objects. After 
imprinting upon a specific object as a social partner upon hatching, chicks were 
given a choice between a screen leaned at an angle that was consistent with that 
same object being hidden beneath it, or one leant at such an angle that the object 
could not be hidden behind it. Chicks consistently chose the screen angled such that 
their imprinted ‘companion’ could have been hidden beneath it, indicating a 
rudimentary framework encompassing physical properties of the objects around 
them. Exact mechanisms and whether such understandings of folk physics is due to 
causal relations (Bird & Emery, 2010) or by trial and error (Povinelli, 2000) either in 
specific contexts or when reasoning about physical interaction altogether is still 
largely unclear. Whether such an understanding could be extended to physical 
properties and limitations as it relates to other individual’s bodies is yet a further 
question yet unexplored in most species (Vonk & Subiaul, 2009).
 The present study demonstrates that a biologically naïve bird has the ability to 
form rules about a physiologically dissimilar species  based on observable features – 
but does not answer whether they are generalizable, or disentangle relevant and 
irrelevant visual cues (2009). If a mealworm was within reach only of an 
experimenter’s legs, but not arms, for example – would robins adapt their response? 
Given the vast differences in avian and primate physical structure and use of limbs, 
such a question is even more complex when asked inter- than intraspecies, and of a 
naïve bird species in reference to humans. Vonk (2009) raises the question of 
whether causal reasoning is  specific to social reasoning, and whether this might be 
the reason chimpanzees were unable to generalise the physical causality of limbs for 
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humans. That can’t entirely explain results of either Vonk’s or the present study, but 
makes it all the more interesting that these birds are able to show even a basic 
systematic response despite lack of co-evolution or clear ecological roles (e.g. 
predatory). Whether this is  due to an underlying mechanism or exposure to humans 
walking around the sanctuary paths through robin territories is  still an open question, 
begging further investigation with variably exposed populations. 
 In wild animals, exposure and environmental conditions may play a significant 
role in how such cognitive abilities  play out – even if some shared representations 
exist across species, responses between species based on differing physiology (a 
raptor’s acute visual system for example) can still be acquired and adapted to 
through exposure to those species. For example, New Caledonian crows show a 
context-dependent use of tools for foraging (Hunt, Rutledge, & Gray, 2006; Taylor, 
Elliffe, Hunt, & Gray, 2010; Taylor et al., 2011; Taylor, Hunt, & Gray, 2012; Taylor et 
al., 2009) by manipulating wire to form a hook or choosing the right length or type of 
tool to fit a specific task. Additionally, one study shows that given the right conditions, 
wolves outperform dogs recognising distal pointing (Udell, Dorey, & Wynne, 2008), 
despite research to the contrary (Hare, Brown, Williamson, & Tomasello, 2002; 
Miklósi et al., 2003). 
 A foundational understanding of physical capability underlying reasoning about 
object-directed action (Phillips  et al., 2009) might not be specific to within the primate 
order. While certain features may well be, a basic framework of observable physical 
cues and their relation to an agent’s physical capability could be a more broadly 
applicable capacity. Evidence of ravens (Corvus corax) using referential declarative 
signals amongst themselves in the wild, offering non-edible items in specific social 
contexts  (Pika & Bugnyar, 2011), or self-agency in chimps (Kaneko & Tomonaga, 
2011), recognising abstract cursor control without direct physical contact may both 
be seen as  related to such a capacity, though the exact extent remains to be seen. 
The present study attempts to lay the groundwork for further investigation; whether 
North Island robins can flexibly apply visual information that may be salient to 
physical capability (i.e. limb visibility and distance to an object), and to what extent 
the mobility of the visible part of the body influences response (limb versus torso) is 
certainly an aim for future exploration.
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CHAPTER 7: Study 6 – Perception of Prey Animacy
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 Caching species more often store food that has a relatively long shelf-life, such 
as nuts or seeds (Sherry, 1985), rather than highly perishable food like flesh from 
living prey or soft fruits. In this respect, North Island, and New Zealand robins in 
general, are extremely unique in that the food that they hoard throughout their 
territories are almost exclusively insects that have been hunted and then stunned or 
killed (and sometimes partitioned if large) before caching (Menzies & Burns, 2008; 
Van Horik & Burns, 2007). Due to the high perishability of the food stored, robins 
retrieve stores within 1-3 days of them being made (Powlesland, 1980). In the 
cognitive experiments conducted in the studies  presented here on North Island 
robins, mealworms (and sometimes waxworms) are used as prey both in choice and 
Violation of Expectancy (VoE) tasks. A small handful of other studies use living prey 
such as crickets (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007) and fruit flies (Uller et al., 2003) or in some 
cases conspecifics (Agrillo et al., 2007; Agrillo et al., 2008; Dadda et al., 2009; 
McComb et al., 1994) as the countable ‘items’ in a numerical discrimination task, but 
the larger portion of such experiments are done with inanimate objects such as 
tokens or plant-based food (see Chapter 2). 
 The unique nature of New Zealand robins’ storage of hunted prey rather than 
completely inanimate food objects creates something of a grey area in cognitive 
behavioural research such as that presented here. For studies such as  those 
presented in Chapters 2 or 4, for example, focusing on quantities  of ‘items’, the 
‘objects’ presented in both VoE and choice tasks  are living mealworms or waxworms. 
These paradigms are formed on the basis of a theory that assumes that the objects 
responded to are characterised by, and limited to, properties  specific only to 
inanimate objects; persisting over occlusion and subject to laws  of physics such as 
gravity and motion only as a consequence of being acted on (Spelke, 2000; Spelke 
& Kinzler, 2007). However, in order to successfully adapt hunting strategy for 
different prey, behavioural responses to that prey must of course be mediated by 
characteristics  of that prey: agent rather than an object; causality and self-propelled 
motion, varying mobility and goal-directedness (whether or not this  is perceived as 
such by either the prey or the predator; such is  not assumed here) (Leslie, 1994; 
Spelke & Kinzler, 2007).  Whether some basic representation of agency is  used, or 
behavioural rules are developed by experience and tailored to differing prey 
behaviour (e.g. movement for escape) – ostensibly, for robins, prey is first animate, 
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and then strategically killed and stored as objects. This  study aims to begin 
investigating the boundary between the animate-inanimate distinction in such prey, 
and how responses  of North Island robins might be influenced by expectations 
specific to the type of prey, or the animacy state of prey. 
 Arguably, the most important function of an agency system is agency detection – 
the ability to discriminate between things capable of goal-directed action and self-
propulsion and things  that are not; an ability that appears to have its own dedicated 
neural network (Gobbini et al., 2011). There are obvious costs and benefits resulting 
from the ability (or failure) of an animal to successfully and reliably detect agency, 
particularly in reference to predator-prey interaction, where life and reproduction 
often hangs in the balance not just in detecting animacy in surroundings, but 
detecting it quickly and identifying threats or opportunities (Barrett, 2005; Barrett & 
Behne, 2005). Over the course of time, it is  of course exactly this interaction of 
success and failure in recognition that shapes the evolution of such detection 
systems present in nearly all species (Barrett & Behne, 2005). This very basic 
categorisation of the world – animate/agent and inanimate/object – and the resultant 
ability to respond differently to each category (Barrett & Behne, 2005; Spelke & 
Kinzler, 2007) allows species  to integrate more complex behaviours within such a 
framework; responding with a fine-tuned suite of behaviours geared toward specific 
prey, like bee-eaters (Watve et al., 2002), or in the case of human infants, the ability 
to built entire hierarchies of subcategories with associated representations and 
contexts.
 Development of the animate-inanimate distinction (Gelman & Spelke, 1981; 
Gelman & Opfer, 2002) in humans is not a simple or straightforward process. 
Wheatly et al. (2007) hypothesise the engagement of the mirror system in 
understanding animate agents. By the age of 6 months, infants associate some 
animate properties with people, but they do not associate the appropriate properties 
to the broad category of animates and inanimate until at least the middle of the 2nd 
year (Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001). At preschool age, children do not yet appear 
to consistently differentiate subcategories of inanimacy, such as dead, inactive, 
unreal or absent (Carey, 1985; Gelman & Gottfried, 1996; Slaughter, Jaakkola, & 
Carey, 1999). By the age of about 4 however, causal cues to death prevent the 
attribution of agency to animals and people, whereas cues to sleep do not – and this 
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particular pattern of development appears  to remain consistent across cultures. By 
the age of 4, children understand the concept of death as the cessation of agency in 
such a way that causal cues relating to death inhibit the attribution of agency to 
animals and people (Barrett & Behne, 2005). In animals however, any kind of 
understanding of their perception about cessation of animacy is considerably more 
difficult to broach with such specificity.
 Causality and self propelled motion are key features of identifying animacy. In a 
habituation/dishabituation experiment, for example, when exposed to videos either 
with natural causal sequences (such as a hand picking up an item and carrying it off 
screen), or unnatural sequences (where the hand does not pick up the item but both 
move off screen), chimpanzees (Pan spp.) looked significantly longer at unnatural 
physical events than natural ones (O’Connell & Dunbar, 2005). Newly hatched 
domestic chickens (Gallus gallus) also show a sensitivity for self-propelled causal 
agency, and when shown objects that are either display self-propelled or caused 
motion (Mascalzoni, Regolin, & Vallortigara, 2010), prefer to associate with self-
propelled objects as companions. 
 According to Rakison and Poulin-Dubois (2001), drawing on patterns emergent 
from infant research on representation and categorisation of animacy, there are 
seven characteristic properties of animate-inanimate distinction, all of which are 
related to physical or psychological causality. In this proposal, animates display 1) 
the self-propelled onset of motion, rather than externally caused, 2) a smooth line of 
trajectory, as opposed to irregular, 3) causal action at a distance, rather than from 
physical contact, 4) a contingent rather than non-contingent pattern of interaction, 5) 
an agent type of causal role rather than recipient, 6) a purposeful, goal-directed 
action, as opposed to without aim, and 7) the influence of an intentional mental state 
rather than accidental. In a review of research based on visual interpretation of very 
simple two-dimensional shapes interacting in either a causal or self propelled way, 
Scholl and Tremoulet (2000) conclude that the visual system involves a mechanism 
which focuses on features like causality and animacy in objects. Such a system 
would inform causal and social structure of surroundings, the same way that the 
visual system has a mechanism focusing on physical features in order to inform 3-
dimensional structure of the surrounding world.  
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 Agency detection and perception of varying states of animacy is perhaps 
unsurprisingly under-investigated in the context of caching live prey in the wild, given 
the relative rarity of this  behaviour, and inherent difficulties in experimentally 
determining underlying cognitive aspects  of such an adaptive behaviour. A few 
species depend on either killing, paralysing, or in some cases even maintaining live 
prey and then caching it for short or long periods of time depend on such distinctions 
for the success or failure of their livelihood. Jaguars  often hang carcasses in trees or 
sometimes bury them, wolves and foxes sometimes bury whole or partial carcasses, 
and some species of moles and shrews store earthworms in ‘knots’ underground 
(Vander Wall, 1990). The majority of caching birds however, appear to cache less 
perishable plant-based food such as seeds, although New Caledonian crows are 
unusually skilled at using tools to poke insect larvae out of trees (Bluff, Weir, Rutz, 
Wimpenny, & Kacelnik, 2007; Taylor et al., 2012; Taylor, Hunt, Holzhaider, & Gray, 
2007), and Scrub Jays (Aphelocoma coerulescens) in experimental conditions will 
only recover caches of highly perishable worms or crickets after a shorter interval, 
and switch to recovering less perishable peanuts after longer intervals without 
access (Clayton & Dickinson, 1999; Clayton, Emery, & Dickinson, 2006b). Scrub jays 
also sometimes cache insects  or fruit in addition to seeds in the wild (Emery et al., 
2004), although the exact extent to which Scrub Jay caches in the wild are 
composed of insect matter seems less clear (Sherry, 1985). Accurately judging the 
time of death is  important to knowing the perishability of the food source, or being 
able to distinguish paralysis from death (and hunt accordingly) can lengthen the shelf 
life of a food.  
 Prey preference and selection is  often based on movement – biological motion 
(Johansson, 1973). Domestic chicks (Gallus gallus) for example, prefer to peck at 
insect-like elongated stimuli moving in a direction orthogonal to their longer axis (i.e. 
‘sideways’ rather than ‘forward’) in a computer simulation test (Clara, Regolin, 
Vallortigara, & Rogers, 2009), and even prefer to approach a point-light animation 
exhibiting biological motion patterns (Vallortigara, Regolin, & Marconato, 2005). Grey 
partridge chicks’ (Perdix perdix) food preference is influenced by colour (yellow/
green), size (large but able to be swallowed whole), and movement – preferring 
living to dead insects  whether fast or slow moving, as well as being a determining 
factor in the small insects that were selected (Moreby, Aebischer, & Southway, 2006).
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 This  study examines the response of North Island robins to a within-subject study 
composed of 2 experiments, testing the Violation of Expectancy (VoE) of both the 
type (and mobility) and state of animacy of prey. In the Experiment 1, three different 
types of prey are presented, with varying levels  of mobility, including mealworms 
(Tenebrio molitor larvae), earthworms (Eisenia Andrei), and locusts (Locusta 
migratoria). Each type is  presented in one congruent trial, where the same type of 
insect placed in the box is revealed by the bird, and one incongruent trial, where no 
insect is found after one is  visibly placed inside the box. It is expected that in all three 
cases, search times for incongruent trials will be longer than responses to congruent 
trials. The question this design hopes to answer is whether search times in trials 
where the insect is  not found is significantly longer or shorter for one insect with 
comparison to another. In Experiment 2, only mealworm prey was presented in 
varying states of animacy, including live, dead, halved, and in some cases a small 
twig with roughly the same coloration and dimensions of a mealworm. This 
experiment aims to discern whether robins  will search longer when the animacy state 
of prey alters, and which alteration of state might result in a longer search time, 
indicating a sensitivity to animacy state of cached prey. 
Methods
 Subjects. A total of 11 individual adult robins  participated in this study, with each 
participating in both experiments. Each subject was identified with the unique 
combination of coloured bands on the bird’s  legs. All of the robins used in this  study 
had prior experimental history (see Appendix A).
 Apparatus. Trials  were performed by presenting subjects  with either mealworms 
(Tenebrio molitor larvae), earthworms (Eisenia Andrei), locusts (Locusta migratoria), 
or a small stick (roughly analogous in size and colour to a mealworm) in a wooden 
encasement designed for Violation of Expectancy (VoE) testing (see Figure 21 and 
Appendix C for links to video footage). The box measured 9.5cm wide, 4cm tall, and 
17cm long, with a thin, particleboard slider protruding from one side which extends 
out when pulled and slides into the box when pushed. This slider attaches to an 
upper compartment comprising a clear Petri dish measuring 6cm in diameter 
mounted on the inside of the box. The side of the Petri dish facing the inside of the 
box into which it can be pulled is covered in opaque black tape so that only the 
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contents of the dish is visible when this sliding compartment is pushed into the box. 
A hole measuring 6cm in diameter on the surface of the box allows the subject to see 
either the sliding compartment (1cm deep), when it is pushed into the box. The well 
below is accessible when the sliding compartment is pulled out fully, and lined with 
the same type and size plastic petri dish. The plastic lining of each well served to 
prevent the mealworms from being able to climb the rough wooden surface of the 
encasement. The well was covered with a circular brown leather flap approximately 
7cm across. Insect prey were placed in the apparatus with stainless steel tweezers, 
to enable the clearest possible view of the prey.
 Procedure. In both experiments, the VoE box was used with both the upper and 
lower compartments filled, regardless of whether the outcome was expected (items 
were the same) or unexpected (items differed). In that manner, all robins observed 
prey being dropped only into the lower compartment, and always were only able to 
retrieve it from the upper. In such a manner, any difference in response based on a 
perceived difference in depth of the well, or any other aural or visual cues that may 
not be apparent to the experimenter, such would be the case both for expected and 
unexpected events.
 Experiment 1: Prey type. Robins  were shown 6 different hiding events with 
order controlled using a Latin Square, of which 3 were congruent (the same type of 
insect dropped in was found) and 3 were incongruent (no insect was found) (see 
Table 5). 
Table 5. Congruent and Incongruent conditions presented in Experiment 1, altering 
item type. 
Experiment 1
Prey Item Condition Viewed Entering Box Revealed
Locust 1 Living Insect Living Insect2 Living Insect Empty
Mealworm 3 Living Insect Living Insect4 Living Insect Empty
Earthworm 5 Living Insect Living Insect6 Living Insect Empty
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Figure 21. The VoE apparatus: Out of view of the bird, in the upper compartment, (a) 
insects are placed inside and (b) the compartment is slid out, hiding it. In view of the 
bird, in the lower compartment (c) insects are placed inside (d) the lid covers the 
well, (e) the drawer is  slid in, and (f) the bird allowed to access the upper 
compartment.
 The sliding compartment of the VoE box was first loaded with an insect 
(mealworm, earthworm or locust) intended for the robin to find, out of view of the 
experimental subject, and the sliding compartment was pulled fully out so that the 
contents was  not visible. In the events where nothing is found, no insect was pre-
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loaded into this  compartment. The VoE box was then placed so that it was clearly 
visible to the subject, within a 1-3m distance of the robin’s viewing position. A clear 
plastic container housing a number of the insects about to be dropped into the VoE 
box is set next to the box, in order that the robin sees the insects actively moving 
about inside the container. One live insect was taken with tweezers and first 
displayed clearly for approx. 4s by holding it directly over the well, in order to give the 
robin the opportunity to clearly see the type of insect and its movement. It was then 
dropped in clear view of the robin into the empty bottom compartment of the VoE 
box, and subsequently covered with the leather flap. The hidden sliding compartment 
drawer is then pushed closed, so the robin finds only what is  in the upper 
compartment (either empty, or with the same type of insect that was seen dropped 
in). Lastly, robins were given the opportunity to approach and uncover the well, and 
retrieve a combination of worms either consistent or inconsistent with the category of 
worms they observed being added or removed. 
 Experiment 2: Prey animacy. In this experiment, robins were shown 8 different 
hiding events with mealworm prey hidden and then found in different states  (live, 
dead, halved), or in some cases  substituted by a small stick (see Table 6). Of these, 
2 were found congruent (e.g. Live-live, dead-dead), 2 were halved (live-half, dead-
half), 2 were found living (dead-live, stick-live), and 2 were found inert (live-dead, 
live-stick).
Table 6. Congruent and Incongruent conditions presented in Experiment 2, altering 
item animacy. 
Experiment 2
Condition Viewed Entering Box Revealed
1 Living Mealworm Living Mealworm
2 Living Mealworm Dead Mealworm
3 Living Mealworm Half Mealworm
4 Dead Mealworm Dead Mealworm
5 Dead Mealworm Living Mealworm
6 Dead Mealworm Half Mealworm
7 Living Mealworm Stick
8 Stick Living Mealworm
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 Order of exposure was controlled using a Latin Square. The sliding compartment 
of the VoE box was first loaded with state of insect (or stick) intended for the robin to 
find, out of view of the experimental subject, and the sliding compartment was pulled 
fully out so that the contents was not visible. The VoE box was then placed so that it 
was clearly visible to the subject, within a 1-3m distance of the robin’s viewing 
position. A clear plastic container housing a number of the insects  about to be 
dropped into the VoE box is  set next to the box, in order that the robin sees the 
insects either actively moving or inert inside the container. One insect was taken with 
tweezers and first displayed clearly for approx. 4s  by holding it directly over the well, 
in order to give the robin the opportunity to clearly see the type of insect and its  state 
(active movement or inert). It was  then dropped in clear view of the robin into the 
empty bottom compartment of the VoE box, and subsequently covered with the 
leather flap. The hidden sliding compartment drawer is then pushed closed, so the 
robin finds  only what is in the upper compartment (either alive or inert). Lastly, robins 
were given the opportunity to approach and uncover the well, and retrieve a 
combination of worms either consistent or inconsistent with the category of worms 
they observed being added or removed.
Results
 A video analysis was performed looking at 3 different dimensions  of response 
behaviour: First, general attendance duration (AD) – the amount of time the subject 
spent within 1 meter of the apparatus, generally attending even when not actively 
searching. Second, active search duration (SD) – the total amount of time the robin 
spent actively examining the apparatus or leather cover. Third, pecking frequency 
(PF) – the number of times the subject pecked with its  beak at any part of the 
apparatus. The data was also analysed jointly (across both Experiments 1 and 2) 
looking at the destination of the prey obtained by the robin, and whether it was eaten 
immediately or removed for caching or provisioning, to examine any differences that 
might be seen in response duration as a result.
 Experiment 1: Prey type. This experiment involved hiding events using three 
types of prey; mealworms, earthworms and locusts. An experimenter displayed an 
event where the robin found prey that was either consistent with the prey seen being 
dropped into the box, or found the box empty.
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 Significant differences resulted between the responses in congruent and 
incongruent trials  in multiple dimensions (see Figure 22).  A One-Way ANOVA was 
used to compare means between conditions: congruent trials (N=33), incongruent 
trials (N=33), and neutral exposures  (N=11). Overall, responses for congruent trials 
were on average lowest values (AD 25.76s, SD 21.88s, PF 2.97) and incongruent 
trials measured highest (AD 63.79s, SD 53.88s, PF 5.70), while neutral trials on 
average fell in the middle (AD 33.60s, SD 25.90s, PF 4.35). The difference in means 
between conditions  were overall significant: attendance (F (2, 83) = 12.339, p = .
000), search duration (F (2, 83) = 14.713, p = .000), and pecking frequency (F (2, 83) 
= 4.766, p = .011).
Figure 22. Experiment 1 (Prey type) – Average response in search and attendance 
time and number of pecks across congruent and incongruent trials. 
 Independent-Samples T-Tests  were used to compare means  between each 
condition (see Figure 22). Congruent and incongruent trials were significantly 
different in two of three measures: attendance (mean ∆ 36.33s; t(53) = -4.021, p = 
0.000) and search (mean ∆ 31.26s; t(53) = -4.236, p = 0.003), but not pecking (mean 
∆ 2.03; t(53) = -1.635, p = 0.205), as were neutral and congruent trials: attendance 
(mean ∆ 7.84s; t(51) = -1.070, p = 0.009) and search (mean ∆ 4.02s; t(51) = -0.734, 
p = 0.021), but not pecking (mean ∆ 0.62; t(51) = -3.608, p = 0.342). While neutral 
exposures were on average lower than incongruent trials, they were not significantly 
so in any of the three measures: attendance (mean ∆ 28.49s; t(40) = -2.223, p = 
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0.213) and search (mean ∆ 13.55s; t(40) = -2.724, p = 0.241), and pecking (mean ∆ 
2.65; t(40) = -1.932, p = 0.074).
 There were also significant differences in response between individual insects for 
congruent and incongruent conditions (see Figure 23). Paired-Samples T-Tests  were 
used to compare means between conditions. When locusts were used as prey, 
attendance duration (mean ∆ 40.73s; t(10) = -4.155, p = 0.002) and search duration 
(mean  ∆ 33.73s; t(10) = -4.409, p = 0.001), and pecking frequency (mean ∆ 3.82; 
t(10) = -2.598, p = 0.027) were all significantly different between congruent and 
incongruent trials. For mealworm prey, attendance duration (mean ∆ 29.82s; t(10) = 
-2.246, p = 0.048) and search duration (mean ∆ 25.89s; t(10) = -2.247, p = 0.048) 
were both significant, but pecking frequency was not (mean ∆ 1.73; t(10) = -1.141, p 
= 0.281). With earthworm prey, attendance duration (mean ∆ 43.55s; t(10) = -3.291, 
p = 0.008) and search duration (mean ∆ 37.18s; t(10) = -3.850, p = 0.003) were 
significant, but again pecking frequency was not (mean ∆ 2.64; t(10) = -1.226, p = 
0.248). 
Figure 23. Experiment 1 (Prey type) – Average response in search and attendance 
time and number of pecks by individual insect.
 Very few significant differences appeared between prey types. A One-Way 
ANOVA was used to compare means between conditions. The average duration of 
attendance (64.73s) and searching (56.55s) but not peck frequency (5.09) for 
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mealworms in the incongruent condition was longer than that of locusts (AD 67.18s, 
SD 55.36s, PF 7.09) in the incongruent condition. Incongruent trials using 
earthworms had lower values in all measures (AD 59.45s, SD 49.73s, PF 4.91) than 
either mealworms or locusts. None of the differences in means between these three 
prey items were significant for either attendance duration (F (2, 30) = 0.098, p = .
907), search duration (F (2, 30) = 0.127, p = .881), or pecking frequency (F (2, 30) = 
0.536, p = .591) in incongruent trials however. For congruent trials, values for trials 
using mealworms were greatest (AD 34.91s, SD 31.45s, 3.36), above those for trials 
using locusts (AD 26.45s, SD 21.64s, 3.27), and trials using earthworms had the 
lowest values  in all measures (AD 15.91s, SD 12.55s, 2.27).  Interestingly, while the 
pecking frequency was not significantly different across insects  in congruent trials (F 
(2, 30) = 0.259, p = .774), differences in search (F (2, 30) = 5.207, p = .011) and 
attendance duration (F (2, 30) = 3.246, p = .053) across insects were both 
significant.
 Experiment 2: Prey animacy. This experiment involved hiding events using only 
one type of prey (mealworms), displayed in various states (alive, dead, halved), or a 
small stick of an analogous size. An experimenter displayed an event where the 
robin found prey that was either in a consistent state or in an inconsistent state with 
the prey seen being dropped into the box. Significant differences resulted between 
the responses in congruent and incongruent trials in multiple dimensions (see Figure 
24). An Independent-Samples T-Test was used to compare means between 
conditions.  Overall, attendance duration (mean difference 14.97s; t(86) = -1.976, p = 
0.051), search duration (mean difference 12.15s; t(86) = -2.023, p = 0.046) differed 
significantly between congruent and incongruent conditions, but peck frequency 
(mean difference 1.26; t(86) = -1.353, p = 0.180) did not.
 Prey was found either in the same state it was  hidden (live-live, dead-dead); 
found alive after being dropped in inanimate (dead-live, stick-live), found inanimate 
after being dropped in alive (live-dead, live-stick), or found halved (and dead) after 
being dropped in whole (live-half, dead-half). Paired-Samples T-Test was used to 
compare means between conditions. Robins spent significantly more time in 
response to trials where prey was unexpectedly found inanimate (AD mean ∆ 
15.18s; t(21) = -2.213, p = 0.038; SD mean ∆ 13.55s; t(21) = -2.390, p = 0.026; PF 
mean ∆ 1.23; t(21) = -2.734, p = 0.012) or halved (AD mean ∆ 18.77s; t(21) = -2.459, 
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p = 0.023; SD mean ∆ 13.55s; t(21) = -2.397, p = 0.026; PF mean ∆ 2.14; t(21) = 
-2.255, p = 0.035) with comparison to being found in the same state. While robins 
did spend more time on average attending (4s), searching (8s), and a higher 
average number of pecks (0.50) in trials were prey was unexpectedly found alive 
with comparison to being found in the same state, none of these differences were 
significant (AD t(21) = -1.233, p > 0.05; SD t(21) = -1.503, p > 0.05; PF t(21) = 0.087, 
p > 0.05).
Figure 24. Experiment 2 (Prey animacy) – Average response in search and 
attendance time and number of pecks.
 Prey destination. Taken together, the prey destination – whether it was 
eaten, taken away for caching or provisioning, or left in the experimental box – 
played a significant role in the response duration (see Figure 25), and much longer 
response durations  when the worm was eaten immediately. A One-Way ANOVA was 
used to compare means between conditions: prey being eaten (N=87), taken away 
(N=17), and left in the box (N=6). Trials  where there was no prey found were not 
included. On average, all three response dimensions were all higher when prey was 
consumed (AD = 33.56s, SD = 28.67s, PF = 2.89), than when prey was taken away 
(AD = 7.94s, SD = 7.41s, PF = 1.41) or left (AD = 12.67s, SD = 9.67s, PF = 0.33). 
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When examining prey destination across all congruent and incongruent trials in both 
experiments, these differences appeared significant in attendance duration (F (2, 
107) = 7.739, p = .001) and search duration (F (2, 107) = 8.238, p = .000), but not 
pecking frequency (F (2, 107) = 2.030, p = .136).  
Figure 25. Overall response by prey destination – Average response in search and 
attendance time and number of pecks.
Discussion
 The data from this study reveals  salient food preference information for the North 
Island robin, in respect to both prey type and animacy. In Experiment 1, robins show 
a significantly longer search time when no insect is found (incongruent) after seeing 
one dropped into the box, but do not show significant differences in search time 
between insect types – for example, search times are not significantly longer on 
average when a locust goes  missing than when an earthworm goes missing. While 
mobility of these insects varies widely, for example with locusts able to cover the 
greatest distance at a higher speed, but the earthworms and mealworms able to 
crawl through smaller spaces (and therefore gaps in an apparatus), these or other 
physiological details appear not to have influenced decision-making enough for a 
clear preference to emerge in robins‘ comparative search times. The type of insect 
does not appear to strongly influence the amount of time spent searching for a 
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missing insect, in lieu of altering any other feature variables  (size, colour, 
background).
 In Experiment 2, robins show significantly longer search times for incongruent 
trials, where prey is  revealed in a different state than when hidden (for example 
hidden dead and revealed alive, or hidden alive and revealed a stick), than for 
congruent trials, where prey is revealed in the same state as when hidden. The 
exception to this pattern occurs in the cases in which prey is hidden inanimate or 
dead and found alive. Looking at both experiments taken together, prey destination 
played a significant role in the search times of the robins, as they spent significantly 
longer searching when prey was immediately consumed than when taking it away to 
cache or provision.
 Given the nature of caching highly perishable food such as insects, a keen 
response to the state of animacy a prey is  hidden in, as well as when that state 
changed (prey stunned or killed) could be a vital aspect of hunting and caching 
strategy for a species  like North Island robins. Alexander et al. (2005) note that when 
robins are caching, prey is  frequently injured but not killed. Whether this is 
accidental, or intentional, is unclear, but as  a caching strategy, it is beneficial for 
storing highly perishable food, as already dead prey will spoil faster. A battery of 
experiments show that Scrub Jays  are sensitive to exactly these types of features  – 
the perishability and point in time a food item was stored (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998, 
1999), and additionally whether and which conspecifics were watching (Dally et al., 
2005; Emery et al., 2004), as well as  the length of time lapsed between storing and 
re-accessing a given cache.  
 Robins’ natural diet includes a wide variety of invertebrates  (Menzies & Burns, 
2008), including slugs, stick insects (Phasmatodea) (Jewell & Brock, 2002), 
earthworms (Lumbricidae) (Lee & Zelanda, 1959), and weta (Orthoptera: 
Anostostomatidae) (Gibbs, 1998), among others; even prey larger or heavier than 
itself (Daugherty, Gibbs, & Hitchmough, 1993; Powlesland, 1981). The mealworms 
presented here in Experiment 2, and certain conditions in Experiment 1, are not part 
of the North Island robin’s natural diet, and the insects presented comprise a limited 
array items. A broader assessment of preference for a naturally encountered prey, in 
relation to size (dimensions and volume), features  (exoskeleton, limbs, defences), 
colour and other variables would inform a more complete picture in order to better 
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understand robin’s behaviour with respect to insect animacy as a whole, and it’s 
variation across differing insect species. With such a battery, it is possible that 
stronger preferences or expectations in VoE events might arise between varying 
types of insects based on physical features or mobility. 
 Whether robins’ pattern of longer search response for unexpected dead, partial or 
inanimate items is indicative of a broader suite of behaviours that applies to more 
abstract tasks (points of light or 2D animations) is an open question. While motion 
appears to be a natural category for trained pigeons in that they can discriminate 
between video footage of moving and non-moving pigeons using only motion as a 
cue (Dittrich & Lea, 1993), only some pigeons appear able to transfer the ability to 
discriminate biological motion (walking, pecking) onto displays of points  of light as 
well (Dittrich, Lea, Barrett, & Gurr, 1998). Robins’ slightly longer reaction time in 
cases where the item revealed was unexpectedly alive after being hidden dead or 
inanimate compared to trials where the state remained the same could in part be due 
to these adult robins’ prior exposure to experimental trials  where multiple quantities 
of mealworms were presented in a choice task (see Chapter 2), or more than one 
worm was placed in the VoE box in a computation task (see Chapter 4).  
 The present study provides a precursor upon which to develop a more detailed 
understanding of the cognition behind New Zealand robin’s  caching strategies, prey 
selection, memory, and the role of environmental biodiversity and surrounding 
movement. The North Island robins’ sensitivity to differing states of animacy in prey 
sheds light on salient visual information that may be attended to even in tasks aimed 
at other cognitive domains, such as numerosity or spatial memory. Additional follow-
up tasks such as presentation of virtual insect animations might further be revealing 
of how generalizable such behaviours  are, or whether recognition of self-propulsion 
vs. causal motion plays a role in caching and cache protection strategy as it relates 
to the animacy and therefore decay of such perishable prey. 
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CHAPTER 8: General Discussion
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 The six experiments  detailed here provide evidence that North Island robins 
(Petroica longipes) have both a sophisticated number sense, and a basic awareness 
of heterospecifics’ eye and limb visibility as  salient to social cues to pilfering. It is 
hoped that these studies have accomplished at least three purposes. First, these 
studies lay the groundwork for further cognition research particularly with this unique 
species, but also with other native New Zealand species. Second, they add to the 
body of knowledge encompassing the ecology, behaviour and cognition in an 
endemic species of bird to New Zealand. Third, they contribute to the collection of 
research that shapes the understanding of mechanisms that underly basic 
developmental cognition across species.
Summary
 The first three studies presented here focused on the North Island robins’ 
response to manipulation of numerical quantity. Study 1 explored the Relative 
Quantity Judgements (RQJs) between both small numbers of prey (totalling 5-30) 
and large numbers of prey (totalling 36-120). Experiment 1 presented trials in which 
worms were sequentially dropped and hidden, whereas Experiments  2 and 3 
presented trials where worms were simultaneously dropped and remained visible. 
The data found that robins were successfully able to discriminate between unusually 
large quantities without a significant effect of ratio. In trials with numbers 
considerably beyond the signature limit (<4) described as  characterising a number 
representation system, such as  those in Experiment 3 (36-120 total worms per trial), 
a ratio effect was observed. Study 2 focused on a quantity discrimination task, in 
which summation of items was spatially distributed across two separate arrays, 
containing 7 wells  each. Between 1 and 5 worms were hidden in each array before 
allowing robins to choose retrieval of all worms in one of the two arrays. Results 
found that while robins  performed above chance with the small numbers presented, 
percentage success was lower overall than for comparable comparisons in Study 1, 
suggesting higher cognitive demand for quantities  that are spatially distributed in 
comparison with a single, continuous  location. Study 3 presented the addition and 
subtraction of small numbers of prey items in a Violation of Expectancy (VoE) 
design, altering the number of prey items in Experiment 1, and the type of prey 
(mealworm or waxworm) in Experiment 2. Robins’ reactions to computation were 
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measured looking at the time spent generally attending to the apparatus, actively 
searching the VoE box, and pecking at the box or cover. The data found that robins 
displayed these attention and search behaviours longer when presented with a 
mathematically incongruent scenario. 
     The final three studies  presented here all explored robins’ response to various 
features of agency. Study 4 examined robins’ response to the visibility of human 
eyes when faced with the opportunity to pilfer prey from one of two experimenters. 
Results revealed that robins were sensitive to the presence of human gaze in all 
conditions but one, and preferred to pilfer the mealworm from the experimenter 
whose eyes were obscured. In Study 5, the response to human limb visibility was 
measured in a similar choice task, where robins were presented with the opportunity 
to ‘steal’ prey from one of two human experimenters. In Experiment 1, one or more 
‘limb regions‘ (arms, legs, nose/mouth) were obscured using an opaque cloth, in 
which the region covered for one experimenter was left exposed in the other. 
Experiment 2, in contrast, used a wooden plank to obscure the robins’ view, and 
presented trails where only a single limb region of one experimenter was exposed, 
and none were exposed for the other. The data shows that robin choice was 
significantly influenced by the visibility of the experimenter’s limbs, but did not appear 
to avoid one limb region more than the others. Study 6 used two different VoE 
experiments to investigate the response of robins’ to the manipulation of presence 
and absence comparing prey type, or replacement of items in differing states of 
animacy. Responses were observed using the same measures  analysed in Study 2 
(general attendance time, active search time, and number of pecks at the 
apparatus). Experiment 1 presented three different prey types; locusts, mealworms 
and earthworms, and allowed robins to either find the same insect that was hidden, 
or find no insect. Subjects  responded by searching longer when the insect was found 
than when it was missing, but results saw no significant difference in length of 
response when comparing different insect types (for example, robins did not search 
significantly longer for a missing locust than a missing mealworm). Experiment 2 
presented only mealworms (or small sticks in some conditions), but altered the state 
in which they were found (alive, dead, halve, inanimate stick) with comparison to that 
in which they were hidden. Results indicated that in each case, robins searched 
longer when the state of animacy was changed than in conditions where it remained 
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the same, suggesting that robins display an awareness of the state of animacy in 
cached prey.   
  This  body of research does not delve into the heart of nativist-empiricist or 
domain generalist-specifist debates; those are theoretical problems of a scale not 
intended to be resolved here. It should however, provide behavioural information 
within a relevant ecological context, that may be salient to forming a more complete 
picture of a suite of behaviours  that could help to describe the possible cognitive 
mechanisms driving shared, repeatable response present in this  population of birds, 
and possibly in many other species as well. The evidence provided by the suite of 
experiments described here provides observable patterns in data that North Island 
robins behave by responding to external stimuli in ways which appear in line with the 
behaviours seen in many other animals  and human infants which characterise 
Spelke’s Core Knowledge (CK) hypothesis (Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & 
Jacobson, 1992; Spelke, 2000). It does, however, differ in the parameters of such 
responses in some cases – for example, in Study 1, where ratio is not predictive of 
discrimination of quantities immediately beyond 4 (appearing instead with much 
larger values), or in Study 4, where robins fail to differentially pilfer worms from an 
experimenter facing 90° away from the worm as opposed to one fully facing the 
worm.
 In developmental and comparative cognition, behaviour is  largely used as a 
window into what underlying processes in the mind might be driving a pattern of 
responses that can be seen developing in a predictable way across a lifespan, or in 
multiple species across evolution. While the success of using behaviour as a vehicle 
to describe the cognitive architecture of any given participant, let alone an entire 
species or groups of them, is challenging (Penn, Holyoak, & Povinelli, 2008), the 
importance of experimentally examining such behaviour within varying contexts is 
clear. There are certainly theories of cognitive development that present strong 
alternatives to the Core Knowledge theory developed by Elizabeth Spelke and 
colleagues (2000; 2007), and provide somewhat differing frameworks with which to 
investigate both development of behaviour and cognition in human infants as  well as 
other species. Core knowledge theory (see Chapter 1), in the context that it is taken 
here, is used as a foundation on which to build applicable field experiments to 
explore North Island robin behaviour in its natural ecological context. Although the 
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theory itself posits that such cognitive domains are inherently present at birth 
(Spelke, 2000; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007), the aim of this particular set of studies  was 
not necessarily to provide either support or refute this claim, and to attempt to do so 
using a wild population of North Island robins  would be an extremely difficult feat, 
given their ecology. Robins raise 2-3 clutches of young in a season, and offspring 
start hunting, caching and searching for their own mate and territory well within the 
first year of life; transitioning from parental provisioning of food to independent 
competitors within an extremely short time-frame. Acquiring behavioural responses 
to given scenarios, particularly choice tasks, would be next to impossible to 
successfully determine in nestlings or young fledglings, who would not necessarily 
engage in recovering insect prey themselves, especially with a parent present, let 
along accurately distinguishing what factors may have differentiated such responses 
in nestlings. While age is indeed a very interesting factor in what can be a relatively 
long-lived passerine in protected areas (a few of the subjects of this study were well 
above 5 in age) (Taylor, Boessenkool, & Jamieson, 2008), it is not something 
focused on specifically in these studies. 
 Another point is that using the CK framework as has been done here does not 
necessarily preclude robins  from acting or reacting on the basis of either perceived 
stimulus or unseen processes that are unforeseen by experimenters here or in 
previous works (Hunt et al., 2008; Menzies & Burns, 2008). Robin behaviour in this 
collection of studies is  indicative of a basic, and in some cases more complex, ability 
to act systematically within the context of certain information: they could be called 
specialists in discerning quantities when it comes to prey inventory, and are sensitive 
to visual cues such as eyes and limbs, which sometimes carry socially significant 
information, even in heterospecifics that are evolutionarily distant and invasive in the 
native environment. These studies do not, however, broach more complex cognitive 
abilities that frequently come under debate (Penn & Povinelli, 2007; Penn et al., 
2008; Povinelli & Vonk, 2004), such as transitive interference or theory of mind 
(Bugnyar, 2007; Pika & Bugnyar, 2011).
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Interpretation
 In many ways, the studies  presented here can be seen as an exercise in 
behavioural ecology, viewed through the window of developmental cognition.  While 
information derived by comparative studies such as these, and their application as a 
window into the evolution of behaviour and any accompanying cognitive 
mechanisms in the brain, is by its very nature quite speculative. Just as this area can 
be better informed by comparing suites of behavioural and genetic information for 
two very similar but slightly different sub-species, and looking contextual and 
functional differences; so can it be informed by doing the same for very evolutionarily 
disparate species, like those isolated by New Zealand evolutionary history. 
 There are certainly many ways in which the theories discussed above are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive; the presence of innate mechanisms aiding in the 
categorical absorption and analysis of information in given domains does not 
preclude memory and external stimuli acting to process information and using rules 
once experience allows, or eradicate the influence that social transfer of information 
might play on the development and use of more complex cognitive mechanisms. The 
aim in this instance is not to prove or disprove exclusivity or application of any or all 
such theories either to this particular species or life as a whole, but to borrow one as 
a framework within which to begin building behavioural evidence that may serve to 
illuminate basic cognitive function in an evolutionarily unique species. Because of the 
nature of this particular species – the North Island robin – the Core Knowledge 
framework provided the most ecologically salient basis upon which to develop a set 
of feasible field experiments; even in cases where the evidence elicited did not 
necessarily support the defining characteristics of this theoretical framework as  it 
exists today.
 Number. Cohesion has  proven to be an essential feature in discrimination of 
quantities (Cheries, Mitroff, Wynn, & Scholl, 2008; vanMarle & Wynn, 2011; vanMarle 
& Wynn, 2006), and may have played some role in influencing differing results 
between the hidden sequential presentation of worms in Experiment 1 and the visible 
poured presentation in Experiment 2 of the present study. Infants require a larger 
ratio difference to discriminate quantities  of a non-solid substance, such as 
CheeriosTM (at least 1:4) compared to quantities of discrete objects, such as  crackers 
(1:2). Strikingly, when CheeriosTM were then presented as discrete, individually 
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placed objects rather than poured (so they no longer appeared as  a non-countable 
‘substance’) infants were successful at the 1:2 ratio they previously had failed (2011). 
For robins, this may well account for a slightly lower accuracy in Study 1, in the 
condition in which worms were poured in the present experiment; where robins fall to 
chance in the larger 0.50 ratio (8 vs. 16) in Experiment 2 (50%), but not in the same 
comparison when it is  sequentially placed in Experiment 1 (67%) (see Table 2). 
Failure of robins to rely on ratio to distinguish numbers  in the face of the more 
cognitively challenging task in Study 2, where comparisons were spaced out across 
two arrays, is highly interesting in light of the lower success  rates in choosing the 
larger quantity. The distinct difference in percentages of success between trials 
where the smaller quantity was 1 or 2 may be indicative that where quantity 
information is  confounded by space, time or other variables, robins  use a more basic 
single-plural distinction, like that seen in some quantity research with rhesus 
monkeys (Barner et. al., 2008). A mechanism allowing strong singular-plural 
differentiation would allow robins to more successfully make quick caching and 
recovery decisions necessary, even in the face of complex environmental sensory 
and information that surround such decision making, for example, the animacy state 
the worm was cached in (dead, paralysed, alive), the time and place that it was 
cached, weather conditions, prey type (earthworm, weta), and likelihood of pilfering. 
The success of robins in recognising basic addition and subtraction of items in Study 
3 raises the question of how great or small a role capacities like attentiveness to 
individual physical features of each prey item, and whether that might allow them to 
track individual prey or pieces of prey (when large prey is divided). Study 2, where 
between 3 and 6 worms were placed amongst 14 separate locations, and Study 3, 
where search time was longer when a number or type of worm went missing, both 
lead to the question of whether information such as the order in which prey is cached 
(and therefore the age or ‘freshness’) influences any number of natural behaviours: 
Does caching strategy in the presence of conspecifics change? Robins will often 
aggress a mate if they are found pilfering a cache (Menzies, 2008). Is  a pilfered item 
less likely to result in aggression if it was the least recent item cached? Is  the choice 
of item pilfered thusly influenced? Only a detailed continuation of both ecological and 
experimental studies  of such scenarios will reveal the subtleties of this decision-
making process, and whether it is influenced by an underlying numerical system.
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  The analysis of the Study 1 revealed that robins appear to use two systems for 
coping with numbers. An object indexing system and a ratio-based analog magnitude 
system each produce an apparent and distinct ‘signal’ across the number scale. The 
odds ratio for the object-file system hovered just below 1 across all three 
experiments (Exp(B)s ranged from 0.986 to 0.926) creating a signature of a gradual 
decline as  objective number (total set size) increased, a signal that was insignificant 
for sets  below 16. The signature which emerged for a ratio-based system was 
expressed by a very low odds ratio across all experiments (Exp(B)s ranged from 
0.287 to 0.110), showing a drastic decline in probability of success as ratio 
increased.
 The strength of the object indexing system is in providing a more accurate 
mechanism based upon enumerating distinct objects; it attempts to process objects 
as discrete items regardless of magnitude. The recent study with infants by vanMarle 
and Wynn (2011) speculates  on exactly this  interplay between mechanisms in 
infants, reminding us that the analogue magnitude system was initially based on data 
accounting for rats and pigeons perception of continuous stimuli such as time 
(duration) and number (Meck & Church, 1983) and that analogue magnitude 
representations themselves are also continuous, not discrete. They also suggest the 
possibility that estimation of substances  is more variable than enumerating objects 
as a non-solid stimulus can change shape, dimension or break apart upon 
movement – and that two mechanisms are likely to underlie the infant’s quantification 
abilities.  It is compelling that for both robins  and human infants, the same non-
cohesive material in each case (mealworms and CheeriosTM respectively) can be 
perceived and possibly represented as either a continuous substance or as discrete 
items depending on context and presentation; and that in the case of robins 
especially, working memory and ecology appears to extend the item indexing limit 
typically associated with mammals  tracking discrete items. Using New Zealand 
Robins as  a model system invites us to understand the representations underpinning 
numerical cognition in a new light.
 Agency. Speaking specifically to research on chimpanzee behaviour, Povinelli et 
al. (2004) raises the issue that any conclusions made about their ability to reason 
about unobservable mental states is  still a matter of controversy. It is  understood by 
many researchers, primate and otherwise, that not only is there a system that deals 
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with social cognition in such a way that allows for representation and reasoning 
about behaviour, but that this system also then places these behavioural 
representations within a framework of varying mental states (Bekoff, Townsend, & 
Jamieson, 1994; Clayton, Yu, & Dickinson, 2003; Bekoff, Allen, & Burghardt, Eds., 
2002; Pepperberg, Hurley, & Chater, 2005; Tomasello, Call, & Hare, 2003). Povinelli 
also argues that the present experimental paradigm makes  it impossible to resolve 
this confounding issue in comparative cognition research. 
 Regardless of how such studies might be interpreted, it is hoped that the present 
research might be used as a foundation upon which to carry out further, more 
complex studies in the future. The present studies do not attempt to delve into 
something approaching the complexity of Theory of Mind (ToM), but rather, focus on 
what could be considered more elementary building blocks of behaviour. There is no 
conclusive evidence in Study 4 (Chapter 5) that robins’ response to human gaze is 
indicative of an intricate understanding of human intention (if that were the case, it 
might be more apparent to them that the human experimenters have little desire to 
consume or protect the mealworms presented). While we can speculate as to 
whether some kind of ‘like me’ mechanism is functioning, only further study could 
give real evidence of such a system actively in use. At present, data regarding 
response to eye gaze or limb visibility (Study 5) is  more indicative of a basic 
awareness of the function of human physiology, whether acquired through interaction 
with humans, or some combination of other means. This is an intriguing feat in and 
of itself, regardless of speculation on underlying mental representations, given that 
rapid response to eye-like shapes in other species is typically associated with anti-
predatory response (Burger, Gochfeld, & Murray, 1992; Hampton, 1994), given that 
North Island robin populations that are isolated from introduced predators display no 
anti-predatory response in their presence (Whitwell et al., 2011).
Cognition in the Field
 Suggesting that ecological validity matters for behaviour and cognition research is  
not to say that lab based experimentation involving training or other artificial 
environments or stimuli is  not useful, but that animal behaviour studies set in their 
natural context are just as relevant for cognition research as it might be for human 
social, cultural or anthropological research (Emery & Clayton, 2004, 2009; Emery, 
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Clayton, Bolhuis, & Giraldeau, 2005). Experimental research on rats or pigeons has 
served to inform many of the concepts underpinning the way cognition is  understood 
(Cook, 2000; Koehler, 1941; Meck & Church, 1983; Meck, Church, & Gibbon, 1985). 
Bringing ecological context to this information is the other side of the same coin; the 
ability to look at the functionality of these behavioural traits, and its variation in 
different contexts better informs the conception of mechanisms that may be 
underlying them. Zebra finches (Taeniopygia guttata), for example, are widely used 
for both behavioural and neurocognitive research, but captive and wild populations 
may show very different responses to similar measures and even differing genetic 
variation (Forstmeier, Segelbacher, Mueller, & Kempenaers, 2007; Gilby, 
Mainwaring, Rollins, & Griffith, 2011). 
 The present study places these experimental paradigms in the natural ecological 
context of the species  in focus, the North Island robin. In working with a wild 
population of endemic birds in native forest, on their own territories, some measure 
of experimental control is necessarily ceded in the design and execution of the 
experiment. By the same token however, placing such experiments in context with 
the subjects’ natural environment allowed certain confounds to be minimised as well. 
Training, in the true sense of the word, was not necessary for robins to learn to 
access the artificial caches used in the experimental designs here. Brief 
familiarisation with the apparatus, leather cover, and bait were enough to allow birds 
to recognise mealworms (which are not naturally found in native New Zealand forest) 
as desired prey items, and remove the leather flap in the same manner that they 
might overturn leaf litter on the forest floor. In this  sense, preparatory methodology is 
not unlike studies  with precocial, imprinting birds where brief initial familiarisation 
suffices rather than extensive repetitive training at a task (Rosa-Salva, Regolin, & 
Vallortigara, 2010; Salva, Farroni, Regolin, Vallortigara, & Johnson, 2011; Vallortigara 
& Regolin, 2006; Vallortigara et al., 2005).
 Although that may be the case, research to this point has revealed an interesting 
suite of behaviours that beg continued investigation. This  is particularly true given 
the unique position this threatened species finds itself in, in several respects: First, 
the evolutionary isolation of the species endemic to New Zealand as a result of it’s 
early geographic divide from the other continents gives rise to behaviours and 
genetic diversity unlike those on other continents  (Daugherty et al., 1993). Second, 
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New Zealand robin subspecies are the only endemic species that hoard food in their 
wild state. Lastly, the approachability and accessibility of this  species is  nearly 
unparalleled, outside of other isolated island species  that also lack anti-predatory 
responses to humans. Further research necessary to realise this  potential – it is 
hoped that this series  of experiments will serve as a launching point for a more in-
depth look at behaviour, ecology and cognition from multiple perspectives. A number 
of questions arise, that could apply to the studies presented here as a whole. How 
do these behaviours vary under differing levels of human or introduced predator 
exposure? What level of plasticity exists in a given behavioural response depending 
on variations biodiversity exposure and geographical isolation? What role might 
evolution and co-evolution play, and how might comparison with invasive species 
assist in answering that? What behavioural range can be seen both within and 
across different ecological settings, and what does that say about the sensory input 
that a given cognitive mechanism flexibly deals with? How could such mechanisms 
adjust to these differences, and what commonalities do not alter with ecological 
context? Will these behaviours  transfer to virtual displays of information, such as 
animations on a screen surface? Does familiarisation with certain environmentally 
dictated natural limitations, such as typical cache inventory (Alexander et al., 2005) 
or territory dimensions influence the cognitive abilities or limitations  in those domains 
(e.g. numerosity or geospatial information)? 
 As a whole, the results of these six studies show that while supporting core 
features defining CK in many ways, unique results  in some aspects of the abilities  of 
this  biologically naïve and evolutionarily isolated wild species sheds  new light on our 
growing understanding of the shared basis of cognition. It is certainly possible that 
further in-depth study arising as a continuation of the present behavioural research in 
North Island robins will continue to reveal both complementary and conflicting 
evidence when viewed in light of the current understanding of CK. In doing so, 
commonalities and differences arising in avian performance of core developmental 
tasks, with the abilities of other nonhuman species can offer new insights into 
sweeping evolutionary theories that underpin basic cognitive mechanisms.
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 Appendix A: Participant Information
Information about experimental participation, approximate age, and sex of North 
Island robins  observed interacting in these studies. Approximate current age is 
provided; age at testing varied based on date of data collection. 
Bird ID 
Band Sex
Banding 
Date
Approx.
Age
Study 
1
Study 
2
Study 
3
Study 
4
Study 
5
Study 
6
BK-OM
BM-BB
BM-BfP
BM-BW
BM-YW
dBW-OM
fPB-OM
fPM-WR
fPM-YpB
fPM-YR
GR-BM
GR-OM
GW-BM
GWY-BM
KY-OM
OK-OM
OM-BG
OM-fPB
OM-GO
OM-RK
OM-RO
OM-RR
OM-WK
OM-YK
OM-YP
OM-YW
OW-OM
RdB-fPM
RfP-fPM
RG-fPM
RM-OB
RR-BM
RR-fPM
RW-BM
RW-OM
RY-fPM
WfP-BM
WM-WB
WO-GM
YG-OM
YR-KM
YW-OM
Male 2008 >4 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Male 2009 3 ✓ ✓
Juvenile 2009 3 ✓
Juvenile 2009 3 ✓
Male 2009 3 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Male 2008 >4 ✓
Female 2008 >4 ✓
Female 2009 3 ✓ ✓ ✓
Male 2009 >3 ✓ ✓
Female 2009 >3 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Juvenile 2009 3 ✓
Male 2008 >4 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Juvenile 2009 3 ✓
Juvenile 2009 3 ✓
Male 2008 >4 ✓ ✓
Male 2008 >4 ✓
Male 2008 >4 ✓ ✓ ✓
Male 2008 >4 ✓ ✓
Female 2008 >4 ✓
Male 2008 >4 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Female 2007 >5 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Female 2008 >4 ✓ ✓ ✓
Female 2008 >4 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Male 2008 >4 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Female 2008 >4 ✓
Male 2008 >4 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Unknown 2008 >4 ✓
Female 2009 >3 ✓ ✓ ✓
Male 2009 >3 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Male 2009 >3 ✓ ✓
Male 2007 5 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Juvenile 2009 3 ✓
Male 2009 >3 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Male 2009 3 ✓
Male 2007 5 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Male 2009 >3 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Juvenile 2009 3 ✓
Male 2003 9 ✓ ✓
Male 2004 8 ✓
Male 2007 >5 ✓ ✓ ✓
Male 2001 11 ✓ ✓ ✓
Female 2008 >4 ✓ ✓
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Appendix B: Zealandia - Karori Sanctuary
The visitor’s map of Zealandia: Karori Sanctuary
 
(Credit: Zealandia – The Karori Sanctuary Experience)
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Appendix C: Supplemental Materials Online
Sample Trial Videos4
Study 1: Discrimination of Large and Small Quantities
 Experiment 1 (Quantities up to 16, hidden) – Ex. 6 vs. 8 (choice 8)
 Experiment 2 (Quantities up to 16, visible) – Ex. 16 vs. 8 (choice 16)
 Experiment 3 (Quantities up to 64, visible) – Ex. 8 vs. 64 (choice 64)
Study 2: Quantity Discrimination Across Multiple Arrays
 Example – 1 vs. 3 (choice 3)
 Example – 2 vs. 5 (choice 5)
Study 3: Addition and Subtraction
Experiment 1 (Item Number)
 Demonstration – Preparing Incongruent Trial
 Congruent Trial – Ex. 1+1=2 
 Incongruent Trial – Ex. 3-1≠1
  
Experiment 2 (Item Category)
 Demonstration – Preparing Incongruent Trial
 Congruent Trial – Ex. 1m+1x=1m+1x 
 Incongruent Trial – Ex. 1+1≠1m1x
Study 4: Response to Human Gaze
 Condition 1 – Body Opposite
 Condition 5 – Face Covered
Study 5: Response to Human Capability
 Experiment 1 (Cloth) – Condition 1
 Experiment 2 (Plank) – Condition 4
Study 6: Perception of Prey Animacy
 Experiment 1 (Prey Type) – Condition 6
 Experiment 2 (Prey State) – Condition 7
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4 For access to these videos, please click on the link and type in the password: 
AlexisThesisVUW2012. When accessing the site manually, type the following URL: https://vimeo.com/
album/2077882 for a full list of the videos above, and choose the appropriate video from the selection 
shown.
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